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SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH:  INEQUALITY AND THE EROSION OF 
CHECKS AND BALANCES  
Kate Andrias*** 
ABSTRACT 
American government is dysfunctional:  Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, 
everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance.  Who, or what, is 
to blame?  In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political 
parties.  That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit:  Concentrated wealth and its 
organization to achieve political ends.  The only way to understand our current constitutional 
predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in 
our system of checks and balances.  
This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of 
the wealthy elite, and the concomitant decline of countervailing organizations, help explain the 
extent of executive power, the rise of gridlock, and, ultimately, the deterioration of effective checks 
and balances in the Federal Government.  A core goal of constitutional structure—to promote 
democratic accountability and responsiveness to the broad citizenry—is severely compromised by the 
power wielded by organized wealth.  Moderating partisanship will not alone solve constitutional 
dysfunction, nor will conventional good governance reforms like campaign finance regulation.  
Rather, this Article argues, the law should facilitate organizations of ordinary Americans that can 
serve as a countervailing check and prod in governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone seems to agree:  American government is dysfunctional.1  
Politicians are continuously at each other’s throats.  Congress is para-
lyzed.  Budgets are not enacted; legislation is not passed.  Americans’ 
faith in government suffers. 
What is to blame?  According to the standard narrative the prob-
lem is political polarization.  Hyperpolarized political parties mean 
that, during unified government, the legislative and executive 
branches collude and the executive operates with few constraints.  
 
 1 THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:  HOW THE  
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM, at 
xii–xiv (2012); see also David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 
9 (2014) (describing the “gridlocked, agonistic ‘Age of Dysfunction’ that we now inhab-
it”); Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 480 (2012) 
(collecting sources). 
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During divided government, gridlock ensues.2  The President and the 
administrative state fill the vacuum, energetically wielding executive 
power to partisan ends.3  To solve our problems, commentators as-
sert, we must moderate partisanship. 
There is a lot of truth to this standard account.  But it is not the 
whole story.  If we want to understand our current predicament—and 
if we hope to have any chance of pulling ourselves out of it—we need 
to focus not only on partisanship but also on the problem of concen-
trated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. 
After a period of shared prosperity following the New Deal and 
World War II, the United States has, over the last generation, experi-
enced a dramatic rise in economic inequality.  Disparities in income 
and wealth are at levels not seen since the Gilded Age.4  Rising ine-
quality has been accompanied by the concentration, or re-
concentration, of political power among wealthy individuals, large 
business firms, and organized groups representing them, as well as by 
a precipitous decline of countervailing organization among middle- 
and low-income Americans.5  Organized wealth has overtaken other 
civic and social organizations as the key driving force in American 
politics. 
Recent scholarly assessment of money in governance has focused 
on whether it encourages corruption and capture.6  But what the lit-
erature has almost entirely overlooked is how wealth affects constitu-
tional structure, particularly the separation of powers and the opera-
 
 2 Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold:  The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 333 (2011) (arguing that the consequences of “radically po-
larized parties” are “unified government without meaningful checks and balances, and 
divided government that is paralyzed”). 
 3 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 120 
(2010). 
 4 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 347–50 (Arthur Gold-
water trans., 2014); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY, at xxxiv (2013). 
 5 See, e.g., LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING:  HOW CORPORATIONS 
BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 9–15, 71 (2015); THEDA 
SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY:  FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN 
CIVIC LIFE 128–74 (2003); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American 
Politics:  Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (2014); 
see also, Nicholas Confessore et al., Small Pool of Rich Donors Dominates Election Giving, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/small-pool-of-rich-
donors-dominates-election-giving.html (“Fewer than four hundred families are responsi-
ble for almost half the money raised in the 2016 presidential campaign, a concentration 
of political donors that is unprecedented in the modern era.”). 
 6 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST:  HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT 5 (2011); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED:  CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).  See also infra notes 150–62, 356. 
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tion of checks and balances.7  Not in the formal sense of these terms, 
but in the functional sense:  The dominance of organized wealth 
matters for how power is, or is not, diffused and checked throughout 
our government; for how ambition does, or does not, counter ambi-
tion; and ultimately for the extent of government’s democratic re-
sponsiveness to the citizenry as a whole, rather than to a particular 
faction. 
Through a range of strategies—from campaign donations, lobby-
ing, and regulatory comment, to the provision of expertise to gov-
ernment officials and the threat of litigation—wealthy individuals, 
large business firms, and their organizations dominate every step of 
the political process.  The empirical evidence from the social sciences 
is substantial.8  Wealth influences not only Congress and the Presi-
dent, but also the mechanisms scholars argue have replaced 
Madisonian checks and balances—i.e., political parties and internal 
executive branch checks. 
That is, constitutional law scholars contend that the formal 
Madisonian schema of separated powers is, to a great extent, anach-
ronistic.  The branches qua branches do not have fixed identities or 
interests that compete.  Instead, political competition is channeled in 
large part through the political parties.9  Administrative law scholars 
agree, though they point to mechanisms within the executive branch 
that provide an additional or alternative system of checks and balanc-
 
 7 For recent efforts to return questions of economic inequality to constitutional theory, see 
generally Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 669 (2014); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power:  Suspect Class Deter-
minations and the Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puz-
zling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016).  For earlier treatment, see, for example, CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1935) (discussing the 
economic interests of the Framers of the Constitution); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:  On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 The leading account is Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2317–19 (2006).  See also MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 8–32 (2003) (describing the influence of political parties in the 
new constitutional order); Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures:  The Liv-
ing Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1809 n.222 (2007) (agreeing with the assertions 
of Levinson & Pildes regarding the need for constitutional theory to recognize the cen-
trality of political parties); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 633, 644–52 (2000) (noting the influence of politics on controlling key institutions 
in the American system); cf. Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary 
Constraints:  Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 617, 625, 640 (2010) (examining how separation of powers affects voters’ electoral 
strategies). 
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es.10  Under this vision of “internal” or “administrative” separation of 
powers, a multilayered bureaucracy allays fears about the expanded 
executive, curbs excesses of power even during unified partisan gov-
ernment, and enables continued innovation during divided govern-
ment.11 
The “separation of parties” and the “internal” separation of pow-
ers accounts do much to ground constitutional theory in practical re-
alities.  But they proceed largely without regard to problems of eco-
nomic and political inequality.  This omission stands in contrast to an 
earlier tradition in constitutional theory.  For earlier writers, constitu-
tional structure was not just about the formal separation of powers 
but also about “the accountability and dispersal of power, broadly 
construed.”12 
In our current political moment, questions about the relationship 
between constitutional structure and the distribution of political and 
economic power are again urgent.  Today, those wielding significant 
wealth serve almost as a fifth branch of government.13  They check 
and prod the branches, the parties, and the bureaucracy.  Because of 
the weakness of organizations representing ordinary Americans, few 
countervailing checks exist.  The result is that power in government is 
 
 10 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 605–06 (2001) (arguing that rather than powers being split between 
branches, “government authority is diffused among a large and diverse set of government 
decisionmakers who have a hand in the exercise of state power”); Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 
423, 457 (2009) (emphasizing the role of internal executive branch constraints); Jon D. 
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 532, 536–37 
(2015) (discussing the evolution of the balance of power from branches to an administra-
tive theory and beyond). 
 11 See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:  Internal Legal Constraints on Execu-
tive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2007) (emphasizing the role of “legal advisors 
within the executive branch” as a constraint on executive power); Neal Kumar Katyal, In-
ternal Separation of Powers:  Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 
2314, 2317–19 (2006) (describing beauracracy as “a critical mechanism to promote inter-
nal separation of powers”). 
 12 William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State:  The Historical Sociology of James 
Willard Hurst, 18 L. AND HIST. REV. 97, 132 (2000) (discussing the work of James Willard 
Hurst, the founding father of American legal history); see also infra note 89. 
 13 The claim is that organized wealth is a fifth branch much in the same way that the media 
constitutes a fourth estate, see THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE 
HEROIC IN HISTORY 152 (1840), or the administrate state constitute the fourth branch.  
See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (declar-
ing that administrative agencies had “become a veritable fourth branch of the Govern-
ment”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 passim (1984) (describing agencies as a fourth 
branch). 
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both more and less concentrated than the traditional partisan-
focused narrative suggests. 
Consider, for example, the recent experience with healthcare re-
form.  The standard account posits the exercise of unconstrained ex-
ecutive power in times of unified government.  Yet despite a super-
majority of Democrats in Congress, the Democratic President was 
clearly checked.  From the outset, it was evident that the President 
could hold his party in Congress only with the support of industry—
the drug industry, the hospital industry, and the insurance industry, 
among others.  The statute that emerged from Congress in 2010, 
while politically polarizing to this day, represented neither an un-
bound exercise of partisan power nor an ideological pole of public 
policy opinion.14 
Or consider the minimum wage.  The standard account is that 
partisanship explains gridlock on this issue.  But substantial bipartisan 
support for an increase in the minimum wage exists among voters.15  
The failure of Congress to amend the minimum wage is best ex-
plained not by the divide in perspective between Republicans and 
Democrats, but by the success of organized business interests in en-
suring the opposition of key legislators.16  Conversely, when Congress 
recently voted to repeal a restriction on big banks imposed after the 
2008 financial crisis, it did so because organized business marshalled 
bipartisan support.  Notably, those Democrats who voted in favor of 
repeal had received the most money from the financial industry.17 
As these examples show, partisanship is an incomplete explana-
tion for government’s function.  The concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of the wealthy elite is also a critical fac-
tor.  To be sure, wealthy interests do not always prevail in politics.  
Their influence is diminished in high-salience areas and when coun-
 
 14 See infra notes 236–42 and accompanying text. 
 15 Marianne Levine & Timothy Noah, Minimum Wage Hikes Win, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2014, 
1:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/minimum-wage-increase-wins-in-four-
red-states-112565; Constantine Von Hoffman, Support for Raising Minimum Wage Found in 
Surprising Places, CBS MONEY WATCH (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/support-for-minimum-wage-increase-found-in-surprising-places/. 
 16 See Von Hoffman, supra note 15 (“A December Washington Post poll found two-thirds of 
Americans support raising the minimum wage, while a recent Gallup poll showed 76 per-
cent in favor.”). 
 17 Philip Bump, Democrats Who Voted for the CRomnibus Have Received Twice as Much Money From 
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tervailing organizations are present and strong.18  There are many 
values and interests other than wealth that play an important role in 
policy debates.  And wealth is not monolithic.  Competing views exist 
among economic elites and organized business interests, as do differ-
ences in the mechanisms of participation used by the wealthiest indi-
viduals, on the one hand, and business firms and their organizations, 
on the other.19  But together, wealthy individuals and organizations 
overwhelmingly influence elected officials, the internal bureaucracy, 
and the political parties in a wide range of arenas.20 
This systematic influence forces us to reconsider key pillars of the 
prevailing descriptive account of contemporary executive and legisla-
tive power.  First, governmental power is systematically more con-
strained during periods of unified, partisan government than the 
dominant accounts imply, at least on certain issues.  Wealth partici-
pates disproportionately at every stage of the democratic process and 
is well positioned to exploit the system’s multiple veto points, provid-
ing a strong constraint even during periods of one-party control, and 
even when a majority of the public supports action.  Recent experi-
ences with healthcare, finance, and labor law reform under unified 
Democratic government illustrate the point.21 
Second, during periods of divided government, gridlock domi-
nates, but it is not the neutral, cross-substantive phenomenon the 
dominant theory suggests, nor can it be explained by partisanship 
alone.  Rather, wealth interests affect inaction disproportionately and 
benefit from it uniquely.  This is particularly true of organizations 
 
 18 See, e.g., infra notes 142, 158–59, 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 19 For discussion of who comprises the category of “wealth” or “wealthy interests” and the 
different ways in which this group engages the political process, see infra notes 81–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 20 While this Article’s focus is with the Federal Government, many of its arguments apply 
with equal force to state governments.  In particular, the problem of organized wealth’s 
influence over state judiciaries is particularly acute.  See, e.g., BILLY CORRIHER, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, KOCH BROTHERS AND D.C. CONSERVATIVES SPENDING BIG ON NONPARTISAN 
STATE SUPREME COURT RACES 1–6 (2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/StateSupremeCourtsv2.pdf (describing funding of judicial 
candidates by the Koch brothers and other wealthy donors in order to advance an agenda 
that includes opposition to redistributive taxes and unions); William Kistner, Justice for 
Sale?, AMERICAN RADIOWORKS, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/
features/judges/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (noting the increasing level of financial con-
tribution to state court elections and the subsequent erosion of judicial independence); 
Christie Thompson, Trial by Cash, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/trial-by-cash/383631/ (discussing 
the devolution of judicial races from “largely polite, low-budget affairs” to big-budget, 
“political circus[es]” in which large campaign donors back judicial candidates in the 
hopes of garnering votes on the bench). 
 21 See infra notes 227–55 and accompanying text. 
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representing business.  As noted, business interests have been able to 
block changes to labor and employment laws, such as a raise in the 
minimum wage, even when such changes are overwhelmingly sup-
ported in polls.  At the same time, during this gridlock, wealthy inter-
ests have achieved changes to the status quo through private order-
ing—such as by increasingly relying on independent contractors who 
fall beyond the reach of much employment law.22 
Third, because internal executive branch mechanisms are so often 
dominated by wealth, they are worse at diffusing power and enabling 
innovation than their proponents assert.  The experience of financial 
regulatory reform in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank provides just one 
example of this phenomenon.23  In short, wealth both augments and 
retards the various dynamics of functional checks and balances, and 
prods and pleas, in ways that are systematic and comprehensive, but 
not adequately considered by the standard accounts.24 
Some might contend that the systematic influence of wealth is a 
boon for the separation of powers’ functional aspirations because it 
moderates and limits government action even in times of unified 
government.  I reject that view.  Organized wealth has corrosive ef-
fects upon constitutional structure’s functional goals—namely, to dif-
fuse political power and ensure ambition counters ambition, in order 
to promote liberty, governmental efficacy, and democratic accounta-
bility.25  In particular, wealth’s dominance undermines the promise 
that our system of political checks will produce a government roughly 
responsive to the majority will.26 
 
 22 See infra notes 270–73 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 284–91 and accompanying text. 
 24 On the importance of “prods and pleas” as well as “checks and balances” in our system of 
constitutional governance, see Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas:  Lim-
ited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 366–67 (2011). 
 25 Though this Article engages debates about constitutional aims, it is agnostic on the ques-
tion of the Founders’ original intent.  Instead, it adopts the dominant perspective of con-
temporary constitutional and administrative law theory regarding the functional goals of 
the separation of powers.  See infra notes 58–69, 298–99 and accompanying text. 
 26 Of course, no government is perfectly responsive to its citizenry and perfect responsive-
ness may not even be an aspiration of our constitutional system.  See generally Adrian 
Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword:  System Effects and the Constitution, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2009).  Still, there is general agreement among theorists that citizens 
in a democracy ought have equal opportunity to influence the political process, and that 
government ought to be responsive to their views.  See, e.g., HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE 
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144–45 (1967); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 327 
(1993).  This Article takes that premise as a given, without trying to articulate an optimal 
distribution of political power.  For a similar approach, see Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbun-
dled Union:  Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L. J. 148, 158 (2013) (“In theory 
and in doctrine, we can often identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong with-
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Where do we go from here?  Various possibilities exist to reform 
the law in response to organized wealth’s negative effects on the dif-
fusion of power and democratic accountability.27  Much scholarly at-
tention has been focused on reforming voting and campaign finance 
laws in order to make individual political participation more equal; 
scholars have also urged making government both more transparent 
and more insulated from political pressures.28  Others advocate 
heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that harm the poor or benefit or-
ganized wealthy interests.29  While these proposals are important, the 
analysis of this Article suggests that their promise has been oversold.  
Additional, less familiar proposals aimed at involving organizations of 
citizens in governance and politics are necessary complements.30  
Consistent with the Madisonian aspiration, reforms aimed at facilitat-
ing countervailing organization could help check and balance con-
centrated power, ensure that ambition counters ambition, and re-
duce the dominance of one faction.31 
A final note at the outset:  Much of the contemporary literature 
on capture and corruption refers generally to the problem of “inter-
est groups” and “special interests.”32  This Article refuses that framing 
for two reasons.  First, the discussion often implicitly or explicitly as-
 
out a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right.”  (quoting Richard H. 
Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (1999))). 
 27 One way to redress the problem of organized wealth in politics and governance is, of 
course, to enact laws that redistribute wealth through, for example, taxes and transfers, 
mandates for higher wages, and limits on executive pay.  For a sampling of some such 
proposals, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich?  Efficiency, Equity, and Pro-
gressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Execu-
tive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Brishen Rogers, Justice 
at Work:  Minimum Wage Laws & Social Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1543 (2014).  Such pro-
posals are critically important but beyond this paper’s focus on the constitutional govern-
ance. 
 28 See infra Part IV.C (evaluting existing reform proposals). 
 29 See infra Part III.B (evaluating the possibility of heightened judicial scrutiny and noting 
the influence of wealth on the judiciary). 
 30 On the role of countervailing power, see generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM:  THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (rev. ed. 1956). 
 31 See infra Part IV.C.  For these purposes, I accept as a given the basic separation-of-powers 
system.  Accord Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2348. 
 32 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1390 (2013) (defining agency capture as “organized groups 
successfully acting to vindicate their interests through government policy at the expense 
of the public interest”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 29, 30–31 (1985) (arguing for greater judicial review to weaken the role of “inter-
est groups” and to further republicanism).  For a historical perspective on how political 
economy fell out of discussions about pluralism, see Ira Katznelson, A Lost Opportunity?, in 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 185, at 192, 204 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle 
eds., 1989). 
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sumes that participation of organized groups in politics and govern-
ance is bad, in part because such participation leads to the incapacity 
of governmental institutions to serve the public interest.  This Article 
rejects the proposition that participation in government, including 
through organizations, should be discouraged.33  Second, and more 
importantly, referring to “interest groups” or “special interests” ge-
nerically obfuscates the distribution of group power.  On economic 
issues, that power is heavily weighted toward business interests and 
agglomerations of private wealth, and away from the vast majority of 
Americans.  It is this unequal distribution of power that is at the heart 
of the problems explored in this Article—not the fact of organized 
participation in democracy. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explains why the separa-
tion of powers is a useful frame for examining the problem of wealth 
in governance, even though wealth does not typically function to ag-
grandize the power of one branch over another. 
Part II then uses several strands of social science research, often 
treated independently from one another, to show that wealth system-
atically influences existing mechanisms of checks and balances—the 
branches, the political parties, and the bureaucracy.34 
Part III revises the prevailing descriptive account of contemporary 
executive and legislative power.  First, it explores how state power is 
systematically more constrained during periods of unified govern-
ment than predicted by theorists who focus on partisanship.  Second, 
during periods of divided government, gridlock dominates, but it is 
not the neutral, cross-substantive phenomenon the dominant ac-
counts suggest.  Third, internal executive branch checks often under-
deliver on their promise. 
Part IV evaluates the influence of wealth against the functional 
goals of the separation of powers as understood by contemporary 
scholars.  It argues that organized wealth’s effects are deleterious, 
particularly for democratic accountability.  It then considers how the 
 
 33 For an intellectual history of capture theory, exploring how center-left critiques of the 
pervasive influence of industry in particular agencies morphed into a neoliberal argu-
ment against the general governmental regulatory impulse as a whole, see generally Wil-
liam J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE:  SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter & 
David A. Moss eds., 2014).  See also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:  
1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1055 (1997) (identifying a shift in attitudes toward 
the administrative state, during the period 1946–1997, from rationalism to populism to 
libertarianism). 
 34 The judiciary is considered in Part IV.B. 
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law might be reformed in response, arguing for the need to facilitate 
countervailing organizations. 
I.  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SEPARATING, CHECKING, AND 
BALANCING POWER 
Public law has long grappled with the fact that certain groups in 
society have disproportionate power in the democratic political pro-
cess.35  Civil rights scholars address the political and social dominance 
of whites over blacks, or men over women.  Administrative law theo-
rists tackle industry’s capture of the regulatory process.  Election law 
scholars worry about the role of wealthy donors and the disenfran-
chisement of minority voters; they aim to equalize access to the polit-
ical process, while preventing political corruption. 
But the separation of powers has not been a frame for grappling 
with disproportionate political power.  The assumption is that there is 
no connection between intra-branch interaction in government and 
the dominance of a particular group in society.  This is true to a 
point.  The disproportionate influence of the wealthy (or any other 
group) would be a problem even if there were only one branch of 
government.  And while wealth consistently checks and prods the 
branches, it does not necessarily contribute to the aggrandizement of 
one branch at the expense of another.  Rather, wealth operates across 
the branches.  Moreover, it is not at all clear that James Madison or 
the other Framers intended the system of separated powers to be re-
distributive in operation, or that they worried about the dispropor-
tionate power of economic elites in particular.36 
 
 35 For suggestions regarding the following points, I am grateful to Daryl Levinson. 
 36 Some scholars have argued that our system of separated powers and checks and balances, 
with its multiple veto points and lack of a truly popular lower house, was hard-wired to 
produce government by the wealthy and propertied classes.  BEARD, supra note 7, at 165–
68, 324; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM:  THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 149, 218 (1990).  
Others counter that although the Founders were concerned about popular tyranny, and 
advocated checks and balances as one way to limit the masses’ power, they were also fun-
damentally committed to a republican government dependent on the will of the people. 
COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 84–
85 (2009).  Indeed, theorists have argued that relative equality among the citizenry (albe-
it an overly narrow citizenry of white men) was a precondition for the constitutional vi-
sion.  HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 25 (1965) (arguing that “revolution as we know 
it in the modern age has always been concerned with both liberation and freedom,” and 
emphasizing equality, among existing citizenry, as a precondition for American constitu-
tionalism). 
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Why, then, should we think about wealth’s dominance through a 
structural constitutional lens?  For two reasons—and with two im-
portant payoffs. 
First, bringing wealth’s role squarely into structural constitutional 
theory provides a necessary corrective to the dominant explanations 
for constitutional dysfunction.37  According to commentators across 
the spectrum, political polarization in Washington has reached crisis 
levels.38  Because of conditions of relatively high interparty polariza-
tion and intraparty political fragmentation, Congress is paralyzed in 
times of divided government; and in periods of unified government, 
we see legislation that is ideologically ambitious and extreme.39  Poli-
cy-making is now blood sport,40 and rabid partisanship makes political 
leaders less likely to compromise and less likely to govern wisely in 
ways responsive to public will.41  Americans express deep dissatisfac-
tion with their elected officials.42 
Hyper-partisanship, legal scholars emphasize, is not just a political 
problem, it is also a constitutional problem.43  As Daryl Levinson and 
Richard Pildes wrote nearly ten years ago, a system intended to chan-
nel competition through the political branches actually channels it 
through the political parties; in their words, our government is char-
 
 37 See infra Part III (discussing existing structural constitutional law literature’s relative si-
lence on subject of wealth in governance and how that results in key descriptive era). 
 38 See, e.g., Josh Kraushaar, The Most Divided Congress Ever, At Least Until Next Year, NAT’L J. 
(Feb. 6 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-vote-ratings/the-most-divided-
congress-ever-at-least-until-next-year-20140206 (noting that the 2013 congress was the 
most polarized since polarization has been calculated); see also supra note 1. 
 39 See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of 
American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 808–10 (2014) (arguing that fragmentation of po-
litical parties undermines leadership and compromise); Pildes, supra note 2, at 333 (argu-
ing that the consequences of “radically polarized parties” are “unified government with-
out meaningful checks and balances, and divided government that is paralyzed”). 
 40 Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law As Blood Sport:  Policy Erosion in A Highly Partisan 
Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1679–81 (2012) (identifying partisanship as explanation for 
“blood sport” policy battles). 
 41 Pildes, supra note 2, at 330–31; Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 12–18 
(2015); Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of Powers into Practice:  Reflections 
on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 52 (2007) (“On balance, we find 
substantial agreement even among these skeptics that things have gotten more polarized 
and less conducive to good legislating in recent years and that political party domination 
of Congress is a root cause.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Megan Thee-Brenan, New Poll Finds a Deep Distrust of Government, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A1 (“Not only do 89 percent of Americans say they distrust 
government to do the right thing, but 74 percent say the country is on the wrong track 
and 84 percent disapprove of Congress—warnings for Democrats and Republicans 
alike.”). 
 43 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2313. 
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acterized by the “separation of parties, not powers.”44  And because of 
hyper-polarization, the system breaks down.  According to some 
commentators, the executive branch during unified government is 
dangerously unchecked; during divided government, it inappropri-
ately pushes the bounds of formal authority to advance a political 
agenda.45  Other scholars are more sanguine:  They acknowledge the 
role of partisanship but point to mechanisms within the executive 
branch that curb excesses of power, while enabling continued inno-
vation.46 
The partisanship diagnosis for the affliction of constitutional dys-
function is pervasive—and has had profound impact on legal scholar-
ship.47  It has served as the basis for a host of descriptive arguments 
regarding administrative law,48 separation of powers,49 and federal-
 
 44 Id. 
 45 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 46 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 47 On the influence of the partisanship theory, see Ackerman, supra note 9, at 1810 n.222 
(describing the parties-not-powers theory as a “breakthrough” and an “essential reference 
point”); Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter:  A Separationist Response to 
Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210 (2006) (describing the Levinson-Pildes 
theory as “provocative and instructive”); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1512 (2009) (describing as “relatively widespread,” the “understanding 
that the working U.S. Constitution depends heavily on the operation of the political party 
system”). 
 48 David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267, 
306 (2013) (noting that hyper-partisanship and divided government have contributed to 
a new form of congressional delegation of broad lawmaking power to administrative 
agencies, which has come to define the modern regulatory state); Neal Devins & David E. 
Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:  Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 459, 479, 498 (2008) (noting that “the separation of powers between Con-
gress and the White House has given way to the ‘separation of parties’” and using that 
theory to understand the operation of independent agencies); Jody Freeman & David B. 
Spence,  Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV 1, 1–5 (2014) (arguing that because 
of the influence of partisanship on inter-branch relations, Congress is increasingly absent 
from the policymaking process, and fails to regularly update statutes in the face of social, 
economic, and technological change; this leaves agencies to adapt old statutes to new 
problems); McGarity, supra note 40, at 1762 (identifying partisanship as the explanation 
for policy failure in the regulatory state). 
 49 See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE. L.J. 548, 602–03 (2009) (ex-
plaining that the vision of branch loyalty upon which the American originalist vision of a 
separation of powers is based has collapsed and arguing for government in opposition 
rules to better constrain unified government); Katyal, supra note 11, at 2321 (“This ex-
pansion of presidential power is reinforced by the party system.  When the political 
branches are controlled by the same party, loyalty, discipline, and self-interest generally 
preclude interbranch checking.”); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential 
Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 519 (2008) (“The prob-
lem, of course, is that separation of parties serves as no balance at all when both the Pres-
idency and the Congress are controlled by the same party.  In those circumstances, the 
power of the Presidency is effectively unchecked.”). 
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ism.50  For example, scholars invoke polarization to explain the rise of 
executive power,51 including recent innovations of the administrative 
state,52 and to analyze the impotence of Congress.53  They also point 
to partisanship when exploring the relevance of historical acquies-
cence between the branches,54 and the nature of contestation, or the 
lack thereof, on the state-federal dimension.55  Concerns about parti-
sanship motivate numerous reform proposals:  Legal scholars have 
explored how partisanship might be moderated and how internal ex-
ecutive branch innovations can mediate government dysfunction re-
sulting from hyper-polarization, either by providing a check on the 
partisan executive from within or by enabling policy innovation in an 
era of gridlock.56 
The conclusion that partisanship is a driving force in government, 
causing both legislative gridlock and instances of executive over-
reach, is unassailable.  A look at recent headlines coming out of 
Washington proves the point.  Yet the preoccupation with partisan-
ship has obscured another important force in contemporary constitu-
tional governance—wealth. 
Wealth and partisanship are not unrelated.  Indeed, rising ine-
quality, political scientists argue, is one important cause of hyper-
polarization.57  At the same time, as Parts II and III show, wealth’s in-
fluence cuts across partisan divides, narrowing the divergence be-
tween party elites on key issues; it also affects the internal executive 
branch mechanisms scholars celebrate as a check on partisanship.  In 
 
 50 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2014) (posit-
ing that partisanship, rather than something essential to our federal structure, explains 
why states check the Federal Government and whether Americans identify with the states 
as well as the nation). 
 51 See Marshall, supra note 49, at 518–19 (“[I]n an era of highly polarized parties, there no 
longer exists the constitutional balance purportedly fostered by separation of powers.”). 
 52 See Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 79–81 (describing the recent efforts of adminis-
trative agencies to revitalize old statutes to accomplish new policy objectives in the wake 
of congressional inaction). 
 53 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2311 (2001) (“[T]he 
possibility of significant legislative accomplishment . . . has grown dim in an era of divid-
ed government with high polarization . . . .”); cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2344 
(asserting that electoral accountability is least effective “when party control of govern-
ment is divided”). 
 54 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411, 413–15 (2012) (positing that arguments about historical acquiescence 
often rest on assumptions about congressional-executive relations that do not reflect ac-
tual institutional behavior, in part because of partisanship); Julian Davis Mortenson, Exec-
utive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 377, 412–17 (2011). 
 55 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 50, at 1078. 
 56 See supra note 11; see also infra note 350. 
 57 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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short, we cannot understand how contemporary mechanisms of polit-
ical competition function without examining wealth’s effect on them.  
And only by viewing the dynamics of wealth in governance holistical-
ly, rather than as isolated problems of campaign money and agency 
capture, as the legal literature tends to do, does a more complete pic-
ture of constitutional function and dysfunction emerge. 
The second reason why the separation of powers is a useful frame 
is that the problem of wealth’s dominance in governance is analo-
gous in important respects to the problems Madison and the other 
Framers hoped to tackle when constituting the government.  The first 
three Articles of the United States Constitution are designed to create 
a framework for democratic governance.  They aim to guard against 
two broad classes of political pathology, both involving the domi-
nance of one group over another.58  First, the Framers were con-
cerned about protecting citizens who might be tyrannized by despotic 
and corrupt federal officials.59  “In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men,” Madison wrote in Federalist No. 
51, “the great difficulty lies in” obliging the government “to control 
itself.”60  Second, the Framers worried about factions of the electorate 
seeking to capture government for their own selfish ends.61  Thus, 
Federalist No. 51 continues, “[i]t is of great importance in a republic 
not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but 
to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other 
part.”62 
Madison understood the dangers of faction to inhere in both the 
majority and the minority, but he was far more worried about the tyr-
anny of the majority.63  He failed to predict, or perhaps did not fear, 
the extent to which a small elite would come to dominate.64 
 
 58 Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics:  The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 666 (2011) [hereinafter Parchment and Politics]; Daryl J. Levinson, 
Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 (2012). 
 59 Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 58, at 666. 
 60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 61 Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 58, at 666 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION at xii–xiii 
(1998)). 
 62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 322. 
 63 Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 60, at 78 (James Madison) (“By a faction I 
understand a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 323 (“If a majority be united 
by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”).  See also Levinson, 
Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1294. 
 64 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, the overarching concern of Madison and the other 
Framers was with a government in service of a particular faction, ra-
ther than the general good; their object was to prevent a government 
that put the interests of the minority or the majority above “the rights 
of other citizens” and “the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.”65 
Rather than attempting to enumerate the rights of the majority 
and minority and protect them directly, as the Bill of Rights, the Re-
construction Amendments, and much contemporary public law tries 
to do, Madison and the other Framers hoped the structure of gov-
ernment would guard against corrupt officials and powerful factions 
indirectly.66  They sought to shift power to the national government 
in the hope that more factions would be brought into competition 
with one another, thereby making it more difficult for one faction to 
capture the government.67  They created branches and levels of gov-
ernment, in the hope that the different branches would compete with 
one another, creating a self-enforcing check on national officials.68  In 
short, they hoped to create a government in which “[a]mbition” 
would “counteract ambition.”69 
This system of “checks and balances” and “separated powers” has 
analogues in other constitutional systems, present and historical.  
Consider, for example the theory of mixed government.  That tradi-
tion, with its ancient pedigree, is based on the belief “that the major 
interests in society must be allowed to take part jointly in the func-
tions of government, so preventing any one interest from being able 
to impose its will upon the others.”70  For the British contemporaries 
(and predecessors) of the Framers, mixed government was about bal-
ancing the rights of the King, the Lords, and the Commons, and pre-
venting any one class from dominating the others.71  For the Framers, 
economic class was less central.72  But the approach incorporated 
 
 65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 60, at 78. 
 66 See Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1295 (discussing Framers’ structural ap-
proach). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1296. 
 69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 322. 
 70 M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 37 (2d ed. 1998). 
 71 Id. at 74–82, 117–23. 
 72 Historians have argued, however, that class played a role in the Madisonian approach.  As 
M.J.C. Vile writes, the separation of powers “assumes that the legislature will, or may, be 
taken over entirely by the democratic element, and that checks upon ‘mob rule’ will 
therefore have to be applied by branches of the government largely or wholly outside the 
legislature.”  Id. at 37.  See also supra note 36. 
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many of mixed government’s concepts.73  The premise remained that 
allocating political decisionmaking power would be a more reliable 
way to guard against the problems of factional dominance than ex-
press prohibitions on, or guarantees of, particular political out-
comes.74 
The theory and practice of “consociational democracy” provides 
another analogy.75  That model “institutionalizes power-sharing 
among [groups in society] through arrangements like grand coalition 
cabinets, proportional representation in the legislatures, and mutual 
veto rights.”76  Other societies have adopted different structural ap-
proaches to balance power in the face of deep social divides.77  At the 
sub constitutional level, a parallel can be found in the practice of 
“corporatism”—the system of institutionalizing representation of so-
cial groups, such as unions, business associations, and professional 
groups, into decisionmaking boards to which significant authority is 
delegated by government.78  But all of these systems share the basic 
approach of avoiding the dominance of one group over others 
through organizational and structural mechanisms.79 
By viewing the problem of wealth in governance through the lens 
of structure and power sharing, an array of reform options that are 
often missing from the rights-centric approach predominant in 
American public law comes into focus.80 
 
 73 For two accounts of the theory of mixed government and its relationship to separation of 
powers, see W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:  AN OF THE 
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
(1965); VILE, supra note 70. 
 74 See Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1293–1300 (discussing, in addition to the 
Madisonian approach, John C. Calhoun’s proposal for a dual executive comprising a 
Northern and Southern President, as well as suggestions for balancing the Supreme 
Court between Justices from slaveholding and non-slaveholding states). 
 75 Id. at 1307–11.  The leading theorist is Arend Lijphart.  See generally AREND LIJPHART, 
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES:  A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977) (arguing that a 
system of consociational democracy can help produce stability in plural societies); Arend 
Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969) (explaining the concept of 
consociational democracy). 
 76 Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1307–08. 
 77 Id. at 1308–10. 
 78 See Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 
1869 (2003) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE:  POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)) (defining corporatism). 
 79 Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 58, at 1307–08. 
 80 See Part IV.C.  Such reforms do not require abandonment of our basic constitutional 
structure, but rather can be adopted within the existing regime as complements to tradi-
tional reform strategies. 
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II.  THE POWER OF ORGANIZED WEALTH 
Before proceeding, it is important to define the category “wealth” 
or “wealthy interests”—and to acknowledge the challenge of doing 
so.  I use the term to refer to wealthy individuals—those who com-
prise the top 1% and .01% of income earners and wealth holders and 
those in the top socieoeconomic status (“SES”) quintile—as well as to 
large business organizations, particularly corporations and their trade 
associations.  There is considerable overlap among and between these 
two groups.  The country’s wealthiest individuals are, for the most 
part, the leaders, owners, and directors of the wealthiest business or-
ganizations.81 
But there are also important differences between economic elites 
and wealthy business organizations.  For one, individuals and organi-
zations tend to participate in the governance process in different 
ways.  Organizations focus more energy on lobbying and on the regu-
latory process, while wealthy individuals tend to concentrate more on 
campaign contributions.82  Individuals tend to be more partisan and 
ideological in their giving patterns, while businesses tend to donate to 
both political parties strategically.83 
Meanwhile, among wealthy individuals and business organiza-
tions, there are competing views and preferences.  For example, 
when acting individually, economic elites tend to prefer lower gov-
ernment spending across the board, but when operating within a par-
ticular business organization, they tend to favor more spending on 
that particular industry’s subsidies.84  Moreover, business groups and 
wealthy individuals are not always in agreement with one another.  
Sometimes there is vigorous lobbying on multiple sides of an issue.85  
 
 81 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore et al., Small Pool of Rich Donors Dominates Election Giving, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/small-pool-of-rich-
donors-dominates-election-giving.html (“Fewer than four hundred familes are responsi-
ble for almost half the money raised in the 2016 presidential campaign . . . .”); Million-
Dollar Donors in the 2016 Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/us/elections/top-presidential-donors-campaign-money.html (last up-
dated Aug. 25, 2015) (identifying donors who have contributed more than a million dol-
lars to the 2016 presidential campaigns and listing their occupations). 
 82 See Edward T. Walker & Christopher M. Rea, The Mobilization of Firms and Industries, 40 
ANN. REV. SOC. 281, 286 (2014) (noting that “[t]he largest share of PAC money comes 
from individuals” and that “corporate PAC spending is only a fraction of what firms tend 
to spend on lobbying”). 
 83 Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 571; see also infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 84 Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 571. 
 85 See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Behind Closed Doors, Ford, UPS, and Visa Push for Net Neutrality, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-
14/net-neutrality-ford-ups-visa-and-bofa-lobby-fcc-in-secret (describing how Internet ser-
 
Dec. 2015] SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH 437 
 
Yet recent studies suggest that divergence of opinion on economic 
issues among wealthy individuals is less common than one might ex-
pect.86  And while business groups diverge on discrete issues, e.g., to 
lobby for their own industry’s interest, they, like wealthy individuals, 
are generally unified on broad principles of economic policy, includ-
ing tax policy, labor policy, and deregulation.87  In short, as the fol-
lowing sections will elaborate, the category of wealth, while not ho-
mogenous, is coherent.  And, though not always decisive, wealthy 
interests collectively serve as a systematic check and prod on the polit-
ical branches, the political parties, and on the administrative state, 
fundamentally shaping their interactions.88 
A.  Organized Wealth in Politics 
Concern about the relationship between wealth and democracy is 
not a new feature of American political discussion.89  But it is now, 
once again, at the center of public debate.  One can easily theorize 
why:  After a period of relative shared prosperity following the New 
Deal and World War II, income inequality has returned to pre-New 
Deal levels.90  The data from economists are striking.  Since the 1970s, 
 
vice providers have been pushing the F.C.C. for looser regulation of broadband access, 
while technology startups, joined by “a corporate alliance with subtle interests in [the 
regulatory] fight,” has been lobbying for more muscular regulation); Peggy Lowe, Hun-
dreds of Lobbying Interests Influenced the Farm Bill, NETNEBRASKA.ORG (Jul. 14, 2014, 6:30 
AM), http://netnebraska.org/article/news/927265/hundreds-lobbying-interests-
influenced-farm-bill (noting that food companies and energy interest lobbies were on 
opposing sides in the 2014 Farm Bill debate over ethanol production); Amy Schatz, 
Google, Wireless Industry Not Down With Marriott’s Wi-Fi Blocking Plan, RE/CODE (Dec. 22, 
2014, 12:31 PM), http://on.recode.net/1zcxv0y (describing how Google, Microsoft, and 
the wireless industry are opposing the hotel industry’s efforts to gain the F.C.C.’s permis-
sion to block personal Wi-Fi networks on their properties). 
 86 Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 571. 
 87 Id. at 571, 575. 
 88 The impact of money on the third branch, the judiciary, is also substantial, as discussed in 
Part IV.B. 
 89 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 132–35 (1976) (noting 
that the penultimate draft of the Declaration of Rights that began Pennsylvania’s consti-
tution warned that excessive accumulation of land or wealth is “dangerous to the Rights, 
and destructive of the Common Happiness” of the community); CHARLES EDWARD 
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS:  THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 171 
(1977) (arguing that the political power of large private corporations undermines demo-
cratic responsiveness to any other interest in society).  For a discussion of these sources 
and the broader constitutional dimension of debates about oligarchy and democracy, see 
generally Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, & The Constitution 
of Opportunity:  A Story of Two Traditions, NOMOS (forthcoming 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620920. 
 90 PIKETTY, supra note 4, at 20–27; see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner Take-All 
Politics:  Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the Unit-
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incomes of the poor and middle class have stagnated, while the over-
all economy has expanded and the wealthy, particularly those at the 
very top, have become even wealthier.91  Notably, the shift of re-
sources has been sustained, with both income and wealth inequality 
increasing steadily since around 1980.92  The trend is not obviously 
related to either the business cycle or to control by a particular party 
in Washington.93 
As economic inequality has soared, so too has political inequality.  
Putting aside, for the moment, the normative question of whether 
dominance of the wealthy in politics and governance is problematic 
 
ed States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152, 155 (2010) (“That income inequality has grown substantial-
ly over the past thirty years is no longer in dispute.”).  For a description of the literature 
documenting the growth of economic inequality, see KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., 
THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS:  UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 71 n.5 (2012).  While inequality is a problem in other nations as 
well, the United States ranks far worse than most of its peers.  The United States has one 
of the highest levels of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient before taxes and 
transfers, among the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (“OECD”).  Timothy M. Smeeding, Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Pov-
erty:  The United States in Comparative Perspective, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 955, 958, 962 (2005).  
When government taxes and benefits are taken into account, American inequality is 
comparatively even greater.  Id. at 961–63; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra, at 77–78.  Further-
more, while our tax and transfer system is still progressive, it has grown less so over time.  
According to the CBO comprehensive income data, since 1979, inequality rose twenty-
three percent before taxes and transfers and thirty percent after.  Notwithstanding some 
significant progressive innovations, like the EITC, taxes and transfers are less effective at 
ameliorating inequality now than they were in 1979.  See Jared Bernstein, Why Christie’s 
Adviser is Wrong on Economic Inequality, THE STAR-LEDGER (Jan. 5, 2014, 7:47 AM), 
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2014/01/why_gov_chris_christies_advise.html. 
 91 The most comprehensive data on income inequality comes from economists Thomas 
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez.  See generally Thomas Piketty & Emmanual Saez, Income Ine-
quality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003).  For updated tables and 
figures for 2014, see http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2014prel.xls).  On wealth ine-
quality, see KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY:  A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN RICH 122–23 (2002) (illustrating that 40% of assets and 12–20% of U.S. in-
come is controlled by the top 1% of the American population); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra 
note 90, at 75–76 (articulating that wealth has always been more unevenly divided than 
either earnings or household income).  On increasing productivity and work hours dur-
ing the period of economic stagnation, see Jared Bernstein & Karen Kornbluh, Running 
Faster to Stay in Place:  The Growth of Family Work Hours and Incomes, NEW AM. FOUND. WORK 
AND FAMILY PROGRAM (2005).  A recent study predicts that by 2016, the richest one per-
cent is likely to control more than half of global wealth.  DEBORAH HARDOON, WEALTH:  
HAVING IT ALL AND WANTING MORE, OXFAM 2 (January 2015), 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/wealth-having-it-all-and-wanting-more. 
 92 Picketty & Saez, supra note 91, at 17. 
 93 Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 156; cf. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA:  
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY & UNEQUAL RICHES 2 (2006) (arguing that rising partisanship 
helps produce economic inequality).  For further discussion of the relationship between 
wealth concentration and partisan control, see infra Part II.C. 
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and why,94 the evidence of such dominance is substantial.  Consider 
first the disparate participation of economic elites as individuals.  At 
every stage of the electoral and governing process, wealthy Ameri-
cans—those in the top SES quintile—participate at higher levels than 
their lower-income counterparts.95  They vote at higher rates, they 
contribute more frequently and in greater amounts to campaigns, 
they volunteer more frequently on political campaigns, and they are 
more likely to contact a representative about an issue.96  The gap be-
tween wealthy Americans’ participation in politics and that of other 
Americans, which narrowed in the post-New Deal period, has wid-
ened in recent years, particularly as expressed by campaign dona-
tions.  For example, just three decades ago, the top .01% gave about 
10% of all campaign contributions; now they are responsible for 
40%.97  As top incomes have increased exponentially, the wealthy 
have had more money to spend on electoral politics.98  Meanwhile, a 
series of recent decisions from the Supreme Court has made it easier 
for the wealthy to contribute greater sums of money and to do so 
anonymously.99  In addition, wealthy individuals are, and have always 
 
 94 See infra Part IV.A. 
 95 The average amount of political activity rises steeply across five quintiles of SES.  
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 6–8, 14; see also id. at 122, 122 n.8, 136, 169, 197 
(demonstrating that the higher the SES quintile to which a person belongs, the more 
likely he or she is to vote, contribute money to a campaign, engage in political discussion 
daily, be more persistently politically active over time, and to have come from a politically 
engaged family). 
 96 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 136. 
 97 Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 103, 111–12 (2013). 
 98 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 175.  Indeed, more money was spent in the 2012 
election than ever before:  federal candidates and independent supporters spent more 
than $6 billion on campaigns.  Nicholas Carnes, Who Votes for Inequality?, (unpublished 
manuscript) (manuscript at 9), http://people.duke.edu/~nwc8/Carnes_Who_Votes_for_
Inequality.pdf (“In the House, the average incumbent raised $1.2 million; in the Senate, 
incumbents raised roughly $11 million each.”); see also DAVID CALLAHAN & J. MIJIN CHA, 
STACKED DECK:  HOW THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS BY THE AFFLUENT & BUSINESS 
UNDERMINES ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 1 (2013), http://www.demos.
org/sites/default/files/imce/StackedDeck_1.pdf. (noting the disparity between the par-
ticipation of the affluent compared to less wealthy Americans). 
 99 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“[W]e have 
made clear that congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of 
money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the 
relative influence of others.”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
371–72 (2010) (holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend money 
to support or denounce candidates in elections); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 
724, 741 (2008) (striking down regulation that sought to balance spending against self-
funded millionaires).  Election spending has spiked since these decisions.  See Seth 
Masket, Are the Super-Wealthy Buying Democracy?, MISCHIEFS OF FACTION (May 16, 2014), 
http://www.mischiefsoffaction.com/2014/05/are-super-wealthy-buying-democracy.html 
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been, far more likely to serve as elected and appointed leaders than 
are lower-income Americans.100 
However, the extent to which wealth dominates our system of 
governance only becomes clear when we shift focus from the individ-
ual to the collective—or, in Madisonian terms, to the level of faction.  
Two important points:  First, individuals in the top SES quintile par-
ticipate in organized political groups at substantially higher rates 
than other Americans,101 across every domain of organized interest ac-
tivity.102  As social scientists have explored, the affluent are better able 
to afford the financial costs of organization, and to command the 
skills, acquire the information, and cultivate the media necessary to 
keep organizations running.103 
Second, and more important, business organizations overwhelm-
ingly dominate political activity in Washington.  The majority of polit-
ically engaged groups in Washington are organized around economic 
goals and interests, and of such groups, those representing business 
constitute more than two-thirds.104  More than three-quarters of mon-
ey reportedly spent on lobbying goes toward representing corporate 
America—a total of $2.57 billion in 2012.105  And “there is good rea-
son to believe that [these numbers] significantly undercount the true 
 
(demonstrating a spike in contributions following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citi-
zens United). 
100 Millionaires make up only 3% of the population, but they have a majority in the House of 
Representatives and a filibuster-proof super-majority in the Senate.  At the same time, 
people with manual labor and service industry jobs have made up more than half of the 
population since the start of the twentieth century, yet people from such backgrounds 
have never held more than 2% of the seats in Congress.  NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE 
COLLAR GOVERNMENT:  THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 7 
(2013).  For more discussion on this subject, see Russ Choma, Millionaire’s Club:  For First 
Time, Most Lawmakers are Worth $1 Million-Plus, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/millionaires-club-for-first-time-most-
lawmakers-are-worth-1-million-plus/ (noting that for more than half of Congress are 
millionaries); Stephen Lurie, Why It Matters That Politicians Have No Experience of Poverty, 
THE ATLANTIC (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/why-it-matters-that-politicians-
have-no-experience-of-poverty/371857/ (pointing out that nearly 200 members of Con-
gress are multimillionares). 
101 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 276. 
102 Id. at 320. 
103 For discussion of why the wealthy are better able to organize, see id. at 313; E.E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE:  A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 35 (1960). 
104 See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 320, 322 (noting that “[m]ore than two-thirds of 
the organized interests in Washington are institutions or membership associations direct-
ly related to the joint political concerns that arise from economic roles and interests”  and 
those representing business constitute more than three quarters of these). 
105 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
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corporate investments in politics, given that so much political influ-
ence activity is not covered by lobbying disclosures.”106 
While business has always been engaged in politics, organizations 
representing business interests have proliferated and expanded their 
collective capacity over the last forty years.107  Very few companies, 
prior to the 1970s, had their own lobbyists; even at the trade associa-
tion level, political engagement was limited by contemporary stand-
ards.108  With each passing year, corporate America has spent more on 
lobbying and has expanded its political operations.109  Today, large 
corporations have achieved “a pervasive position that is unprecedent-
ed in American political history.”110  Moreover, according to some 
theorists, as businesses assumed this dominant position in Washing-
ton, their ideological cast also changed:  The more “moderate” and 
public-minded manufacturing-based businesses of the 1950s were re-
placed by more conservative and narrowly focused financial organiza-
tions.111 
The participation in politics and governance by business organiza-
tions dwarfs participation by other interests112:  Business groups and 
their trade associations both far outnumber and far outspend organi-
zations representing working and poor Americans and diffuse public 
interest groups.113  Indeed, while business organizations have become 
 
106 Id. at 9. 
107 Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 177.  The Chamber of Commerce, for example, dou-
bled in membership between 1974 and 1980, as did the National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business.  The Business Roundtable, designed to mobilize high-level CEOs for 
the advancement of shared interests, formed in 1972, and has been active since.  Id. at 
176.  In addition, “[t]he number of corporations with public affairs offices in Washington 
grew from 100 in 1968 to over 500 in 1978.  In 1971, only 175 firms had registered lobby-
ists in Washington, but by 1982, 2,445 did.  The number of corporate PACs increased 
from under 300 in 1976 to over 1,200 by the middle of 1980.”  Id.  While small businesses 
figure prominently in political rhetoric, representatives of large businesses dominate in 
Washington.  See John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the Empirical 
Research on Lobbying, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 165–66 (2014) (arguing small businesses 
are less likely to lobby for interests compared to large businesses). 
108 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 9, 55–71. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 See generally MARK S. MIZRUCHI, THE FRACTURING OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE ELITE 
(2013) (comparing the corporate elite of today’s world with the corporate elite of the 
post World War II industrial world). 
112 See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 439 (noting that participation via amicus briefs in 
litigation is one exception). 
113 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 9.  One study found “that 72 percent of expenditures on lobby-
ing originate with organizations representing business.”  SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 
90, at 442.  Another concluded that “[l]obbying expenditures by corporations and trade 
associations represent over 84% of total interest group lobbying expenditures at the U.S. 
federal level . . . .” de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, at 165.  A single business 
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both more prevalent and more sophisticated in their political activity, 
countervailing organizations have atrophied.  “At various points in 
American history [public interest groups and unions] served as 
meaningful political counterweights to corporations.”114  No longer. 
Beginning in the 1960s, and accelerating in subsequent decades, 
membership organizations of ordinary Americans built in the Pro-
gressive and New Deal Eras declined in number and scope.115  That is 
not to say that non-business groups altogether disappeared from the 
landscape.  In fact, the 1960s and 70s saw the founding of numerous 
public interest organizations, along with the rise of transformative so-
cial movements.  But for the most part, the organizations that en-
dured past the 1980s were professionally managed advocacy groups, 
dominated by the elite.  Today, less than a third of the organizational 
advocates operating in Washington are membership associations of 
any kind, and only about an eighth are membership associations of 
individuals.116  Thus, even the comparatively few organizations pur-
porting to represent the public interest are dominated by the wealthy 
and funded primarily by large donors.  Gone are the days when cross 
sections of Americans participated in governance decisions through 
their representative organizations.117 
Unions are one notable exception; their membership and funding 
is still drawn from working Americans.  And unions have continued 
to participate at every level of politics and government, often provid-
 
group, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, spent $1.166 billion lobbying the federal gov-
ernment between 1998 and 2014, compared to $628 million by all labor unions com-
bined.  Ctr. for Responsive Politics,  Lobbying Spending Database—Top Spenders 1998–2015, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&
indexType=s (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Da-
tabase—Labor, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=
P&year=a (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).  The top three healthcare industry groups spent 
more than three times as much on lobbying during this period as AARP.  Ctr. for Respon-
sive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—Top Spenders 1998–2015, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&indexType=s (last visited Oct. 
9, 2015); Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—AARP, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG,  https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=
D000023726&year=2014 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
114 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
115 See SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 135–38 (discussing the origins of the civil rights movement, 
the feminist movement, and the modern environmental movement and the simultaneous 
decline of membership organizations).  See also ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 27 (2000) (arguing that Americans 
have been increasingly disconnected from one another). 
116 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 319. 
117 Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L.J. ONLINE 48, 50 (2014).  For a discus-
sion of how these trends affect political parties, see infra Part II.C. 
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ing a countervailing voice to organized business groups.118  Since the 
1970s, however, the labor movement’s size and power has shrunk 
considerably.119  Meanwhile, over the last decades, labor unions have 
often focused more on their own members’ immediate interests than 
on broad-based political goals.120 
In short, countervailing organizations that might be expected to 
check the power of organized business have not kept up.121  Unions 
remain politically active and continue to provide substantial cam-
paign donations, but because there are so few of them and their 
funding is increasingly under attack, they do not represent a signifi-
cant share of organizational activity in politics and governance.122  
Meanwhile, new organizations representing poor and middle-income 
 
118 As political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson write, “[w]hile there are many ‘liber-
al’ groups in the universe of organized interests, labor has been the only organized inter-
est focused on the broad economic concerns of those with modest incomes.”  Hacker & 
Pierson, supra note 90, at 186. 
119 See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 87–89.  In the 1950s, roughly one in three work-
ers in the United States belonged to a labor union.  Id.  Since then, union density has 
fallen precipitously. In 2010, around 11.9% of Americans were in unions; within the pri-
vate sector, the rate in 2010 fell to about 6.9%.  Id.  For a discussion of causes of the de-
cline, see RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS:  THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S. MARKET (2007). 
120 See Katznelson, supra note 32, at 190–92, 204. 
121 In recent years, business organizations have consistently comprised between ninety and 
ninety-five of the top 100 lobbying organizations, as measured by lobbying expenditures; 
in four of the last fifteen years not a single public interest group or union has appeared in 
the list of top 100 organizations.  DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 12–13.  In 2012, business or-
ganizations spent $34 for every $1 spent by public interest groups and unions combined.  
Id. at 13.  Political activities that are not disclosed in lobbying expenditures, such as talk-
ing to the press, coalition building, and grass-roots lobbying, however, are not included in 
these figures.  Id. at 14.  But there is no evidence that unions and public interest organi-
zations even the spending disparity when such activity is considered.  Id. 
122 See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 368 (explaining that the decline in private-sector 
union membership and relative increase in “educational attainment of union members” 
may be related to “a weakened political voice on behalf of the economic interests of those 
lower down on the economic ladder”); Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 179–80 (dis-
cussing how the decline in organized labor has diminished the political voice of middle 
class Americans).  In 2012, corporations spent $2.57 billion on reportable lobbying ex-
penditures, which amounted to fifty-six times the amount spent by unions.  DRUTMAN, su-
pra note 5, at 8–9, 14.  Recent legislative and court decisions prohibiting unions from col-
lecting fees from objecting workers, while maintaining the obligation that unions 
represent such workers, further weaken unions’ economic and political position.  See, e.g., 
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding that the agency-fee provision of Illinois’s 
Public Labor Relations Act, which required non-union Medicaid-funded homecare per-
sonal assistants to pay fees to the union representing such assistants, violates the First 
Amendment). 
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Americans have not filled the void.  Such groups register barely a 
trace in studies of the organizational landscape of government.123 
B.  Organized Wealth in the Branches 
The Framers of our Constitution, and Madison in particular, were 
concerned about the concentration of state power in few hands.124  As 
James Willard Hurst described the sentiment some years ago, “[w]e 
don’t want to trust any group of power holders to be judges upon the 
ends for which they use the power or the ways in which they use it.”125  
“All forms of organized power over men’s wills should in some way be 
accountable to serve ends of broader concern that the purpose of the 
power holders.”126 
One mechanism to diffuse power was the separation of functions 
across three branches of government.127  The branches, at least ac-
cording to the schematic version of American constitutionalism, 
would check one another in a way that respected the powers and pre-
rogatives of each.  Through the branches, “ambition [would] be 
made to counteract ambition.”128  Consistent with this account of sep-
aration of powers, courts have frequently declined to decide separa-
 
123 See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 357 (noting that organizations that represent the 
interests of lower-income Americans only accounted for a small percentage of the organi-
zations involved in Washington politics). 
124 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 60 at 301 (James Madison) (“The accumula-
tion of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, 
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 60, at 308 
(James Madison) (stating that the central challenge faced in designing governance insti-
tutions is to assure “‘practical security’ . . . against the excessive concentration of political 
power”). 
125 James Willard Hurst, Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 
224, 225 (1971). 
126 JAMES WILLARD HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LEGAL HISTORY 29 (1964). 
127 In referring to this conception of separation of powers as “Madison’s conception,” I 
adopt the dominant description in the literature but take no position on whether Feder-
alist No. 51 accurately or fully reflected Madison’s thoughts on the matter.  Accord Bradley 
& Morrison, supra note 54, at 438–39 n.112 (declining to take a position on whether Fed-
eralist No. 51 accurately portrays Madison’s thoughts on the separation of powers) (citing 
Samuel Kernell, “The True Principles of Republican Government”:  Reassessing James Madison’s 
Political Science, in JAMES MADISON:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT 92, 93 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003)) (arguing that the “Madison Model” of 
checks and balances in Federalist No. 51 is not a true reflection of Madison’s views on the 
Constitution). 
128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60.  Such competition would police institutional 
boundaries and prevent tyrannical collusion.  One of the virtues of this approach, Madi-
son explained, is that it would not require that government officials act responsibly and 
police themselves.  Rather, the model reflects a “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival 
interests, the defect of better motives.”  Id. 
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tion of powers controversies.129  Instead, they have deferred to the 
branches themselves to reach political accommodations, except when 
one branch threatens to aggrandize itself at the expense of another.130  
But, of course, as Madison himself recognized, the branches of gov-
ernment are not political actors with interests and wills of their own.  
Rather, the behavior of the branches is a product both of institutional 
structure and of the wills and interests that motivate the individual 
officials who populate them.131 
There are many different constituencies, experiences, and interest 
groups that shape the wills and motivations of the leaders of govern-
ment.  But money is central to the story. Campaign spending is the 
most familiar mechanism by which wealth influences the political sys-
tem.  Wealthy individuals expend vast sums of money on campaigns 
through independent campaign spending and direct campaign con-
tributions.132  Confirming long-held intuitions, recent empirical stud-
ies demonstrate that such spending results, at the very least, in great-
er access to members of Congress and their staffs.133  Other scholars 
conclude that money does much more, ultimately resulting in the 
corruption of Congress.134 
 
129 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
950 (2005). 
130 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 
(1986). 
131 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”:  Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 249 (1992) (arguing against the use of legislative intent on the 
ground that individuals, not Congress as a collective, have intentions and purpose); Lev-
inson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2317 (arguing that the government does not have inter-
ests of its own, but rather government behavior is driven by the wills and interests of indi-
vidual government officials).  As scholars have pointed out, the Madisonian model never 
made clear precisely how tension and competition between the branches were supposed 
to operate.  The model assumes that differences in election and tenure among the 
branches would foster desired attachment, but it does not provide a mechanism by which 
the interests of actual public officials would be channeled into maintaining the role for 
their respective branches. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2317; see also M. Elizabeth 
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1158 (2000) 
(arguing that formal mechanisms such as the presidential veto and senate confirmation 
power do not guarantee a balance of power). 
132 See, e.g., Confessore et al., supra note 5 (explaining that a small number of wealthy indi-
viduals are responsible for a siginificant percentage of campaign finance donations for 
the 2016 presidential election). 
133 Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congres-
sional Individuals:  A Randomized Field Experiment, AM. J. POL. SCI., Jan. 2015,  at 11 (provid-
ing results from a study that demonstrate that contributions by organized interests can 
help increase access to policy makers). 
134 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 6, at 89, 91 (arguing that congressional corruption is largely a 
result of the dramatic increase in campaign finance). 
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But while campaign spending has occupied a great deal of atten-
tion from the public and legal scholars, it is only a small piece of the 
puzzle.135  Indeed, businesses focus far more energy and resources on 
strategies other than campaign spending.  One recent study reports 
that almost thirteen times more money is spent on lobbying and re-
lated forms of political persuasion than on campaigns.136 
The business of persuading members of Congress to particular 
positions is multilayered and complex.  Corporate and trade associa-
tion lobbyists provide information in the legislative process by 
“call[ing] attention to issues, furnish[ing] evidence about how prob-
lems are being experienced on the ground, and provid[ing] exper-
tise about the anticipated consequences—both substantive and politi-
cal—of proposed solutions.”137  In this way, business lobbyists make it 
easier for members of Congress to support certain policies; they “sub-
sidize” the work involved.138  Indeed, the legislative system relies on 
the provision of expertise by industry lobbyists.  Congressional staffers 
often lack the expertise and the time necessary to perform the de-
tailed analysis lobbyists supply; staffers are often young, stretched thin 
over a number of issue portfolios, and less experienced than most 
lobbyists with whom they engage.139 
Through sophisticated campaigns, organized business groups also 
supply pressure and mobilize congressional allies to take or block ac-
tion on particular issues.140  And, increasingly, corporations are invest-
 
135 In the past couple of years, election law scholars have focused more attention on lobby-
ing.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence:  The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 
13 ELEC. L. J. 160, 160 (2014) (discussing the four goals of lobbying regulation, which are 
“protecting the right to lobby; preventing improper influence; restricting some unfair 
opportunities for influence; and promoting transparency of lobbyists’ activities”); see gen-
erally Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 
(2012) (arguing that lobbyists threaten economic welfare by facilitating rent-seeking ac-
tivities and lobbying for legislation that is not an efficient use of resources); Zephyr 
Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELEC. L. J. 4 (2014) (analyzing the lobbying 
cases of the nineteenth and early twentieth century courts). 
136 Lee Drutman, Despite Citizens United, Elections Aren’t A Good Investment for Corporations, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/despite-
citizens-united-politics-isnt-a-good-investment-for-corporations/2015/03/27/f13e0d20-
d26c-11e4-ab77-9646eea6a4c7_story.html. 
137 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 271.  See also de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, 
at 5 (finding that “corporations and trade associations comprise the vast majority of the 
lobbying expenditures by interest groups”). 
138 See de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, at 5 (noting that lobbying expenditures by 
corporations and trade associations at the federal level accounts for “over 84% of interest 
group lobbying expenditures”). 
139 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
140 Id. at 25–26; see also de Figueiredo & Richter, supra note 107, at 164 (“If we assume, fol-
lowing most of political economy literature, that a politician’s objective function is com-
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ing large sums in saturating the intellectual environment in order to 
influence policymakers and staffers.  The goal, lobbyists report, is to 
legitimate certain arguments, ideas, and solutions.141  When counter-
vailing organizations respond, they can be quite effective.  But, as dis-
cussed above, they do so with a sliver of the resources and with declin-
ing numbers.  On less salient and more complex issues, well-funded 
business groups are often the only real lobby.142 
That elected officials are themselves affluent, frequently having 
served as leaders of or counselors to large business organizations, also 
works to shape the wills and interests of the branches.  Officials bring 
their own beliefs and ideologies to bear on decisions they make.143  
More often than not, these ideological positions are relatively sta-
ble.144  Perhaps not surprisingly, empirical work demonstrates that 
legislators from “profit-oriented jobs in the private sector . . . tend to 
vote more conservatively on economic issues, especially compared to 
lawmakers who spent time in blue-collar jobs.”145 
While those who study campaign finance and lobbying have fo-
cused primarily on Congress, wealthy individuals and business organ-
izations pervade the process of governing in the executive branch as 
well.146  Campaign spending obviously plays a role in presidential elec-
tions,147 and presidents, like members of Congress, have almost all 
been drawn from the elite.148  But wealth saturates the non-elected 
executive branch bureaucracy too, undermining many of the assump-
 
prised of re-election to the current office, promotion to higher office, and ideological 
pursuits, then the politician seeks information on how her position on a given issue or is-
sue set will affect those outcome variables.”). 
141 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 36–37. 
142 See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 285–87 (stating that many of the issues addressed 
by lobbyists for business interests were “relatively narrow and low-profile”). 
143 MCCARTY ET AL, supra note 93, at 21. 
144 See id. (“For the period covered by this book, there are only very small changes in legisla-
tor [ideological] positions.”). 
145 Carnes, supra note 98, at 11.  Wealthier legislators are also less likely to vote to repeal the 
estate tax, while legislators who are heavily invested in the stock market are more likely to 
vote to protect the market from regulation.  Notably, states with more of these lawmakers 
have higher rates of economic inequality.  Id. at 11–12. 
146 KEN GODWIN, ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING:  THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE 
INTERESTS 207–08 (2013). 
147 See, e.g., BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY:  THE UNPRECEDENTED 
ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS, DEMOS 3 (2013), http://www.demos.org/
sites/default/files/publications/billion.pdf (revealing campaign spending in the 2012 
presidential election cycle was over $2.6 billion). 
148 See, e.g., Douglas A. McIntyre, The Net Worth of The American Presidents:  Washington To 
Obama, 24/7 WALL ST. (May 17, 2010), http://247wallst.com/banking-finance/
2010/05/17/the-net-worth-of-the-american-presidents-washington-to-obama/. 
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tions of scholars who celebrate internal or administrative separation 
of powers.149 
Classic capture theory teaches that regulated industries enlist key 
members of Congress and the President to pressure agencies to 
promulgate favorable regulations or to shelve less favorable pro-
posals;150 they do so by lobbying elected officials while promising fi-
nancial or other support for reelection efforts.151  Because of their 
scant presence and their comparative resource weaknesses, public in-
terest organizations are unable to curb the influence of organized 
business interests.152 
Stated as such, capture theory is obviously flawed:  Neither Con-
gress nor the President is a puppet of a particular industry group, nor 
are the agencies mere pawns of their political overseers.  Meanwhile, 
agencies differ from one another, making some more susceptible to 
capture than others:  Some face a concentration of industry groups, 
the absence of countervailing organization, and a disputed mission, 
 
149 See infra Part III.C. 
150 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 
(1971) (discussing “the costs” regulated industries must pay to obtain certain regula-
tions); see generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing the concept of “pressure 
groups”).  I use the term “classic” to refer to these works’ position in the legal canon, for 
although the Chicago School and Stigler are often cited as the originators of capture the-
ory, they were preceded by accounts of public corruption from the fields of political sci-
ence and history, and before that by recognition of the problem of private interest in 
public governance that dates back to the founding.  See William Novak, A Revisionist Histo-
ry of Regulatory Capture in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:  SPECIAL INTEREST 
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
151 On the way in which industry groups contribute to political campaigns and lobby in order 
to obtain influence with executive agencies’ legislative overseers on the relevant oversight 
committees, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991).  See also LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, 
CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103 (1979) (“[I]nterest groups [help] both 
the legislators and the bureaucrats by wining and dining them, lavishing benefits on 
them, giving them occasional insider information about investments, and, in the case of 
legislators, providing them with the financial support necessary to re-election.”); 
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2003) (explaining that an oversight committee’s actions “can 
obstruct and delay the agency’s agenda” and influence its decisions); Richard B. Stewart, 
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1685–86 (1975) 
(contrasting classic capture theory with “subtle” explanations of industry expectation or 
systematic bias); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional 
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 779, 
792 (1983) (asserting “that firms located in districts represented on FTC oversight com-
mittees are favored in the commission’s antitrust decisions” and that “[t]he statistical evi-
dence implies that the FTC is remarkably sensitive to changes in the composition of its 
oversight subcommittee”). 
152 See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. 
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while others regulate diverse entities, enjoy (or endure) participation 
from organized countervailing groups, and have a clear statutory mis-
sion.153  The recent experience with net neutrality is but one example 
of how the wealthiest organized groups do not always win out.154 
Nonetheless, the empirical and theoretical research overwhelm-
ingly supports a theory of “soft” capture in the executive branch.  
Wealthy interests engage the administrative state at every level, and 
with significant effect.155  Industry groups participate actively in the 
regulatory process, meeting with high-level agency officials and lower-
level staffers and participating in reviews of proposed rules and regu-
latory-analysis documents before the Office of Management and 
Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”).156  
Throughout the process, industry officials provide not only opinions, 
but also information about how the regulated industry functions.157  
Particularly where agency activity involves complex and non-salient 
issues, under-resourced public interest and worker groups are less 
likely to provide contrary information.158  Well-financed groups are 
 
153 For a discussion of the relationship between capture and agency design, see Rachel E. 
Barkow, Insulating Agencies:  Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
15, 22–23 (2010). 
154 See Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Votes to Regulate The Internet As a Utility, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015, at B1–B2 (discussing the F.C.C.’s decision “to regulate broadband 
Internet service as a public utility” to ensure that “the Internet is not divided into . . . fast 
lanes . . . for [those] who can afford it and slow lanes for everyone else” but noting indus-
try’s presence on both sides of the issue). 
155 Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–85 (2006) (discussing the process by which interest groups 
secure favorable regulations); see also Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism:  Regulatory 
Capture and Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 437–39 (1991) (describing various 
ways in which regulated entities interact with regulators). 
156 McGarity, supra note 40, at 1671 (“When the agency publishes a notice of proposed rule-
making, the regulated companies typically dominate the public-comment process.  They 
submit reams of material and lengthy briefs explaining why disfavored regulatory alterna-
tives are unlawful, unduly burdensome, unsupported by the available technical studies, or 
unlikely to achieve the agency’s desired goal.”); see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation 
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1295–1315 (1986) (describing how the evo-
lution of judicial review of agency rulemaking opened the door to industry challenges); 
Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 206 (1974) (“It 
has been widely assumed that [the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of judicial review] is 
applicable to informal rulemaking.”). 
157 See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules:  Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discre-
tion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999); Stewart, supra note 151, at 1713–14 (explaining 
that industry officials often provide information because “agency staff resources are nor-
mally limited in comparison to industry resources”). 
158 See Willian T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY 595, 606–
07 (1986) (“When issues are highly complex and not very salient, conditions are ripe for 
policymaking by a power elite.  The public is virtually excluded from the policymaking 
process, because the issues are too obscure and too abstruse.”); McGarity, supra note 40, 
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also able to monitor agencies and challenge administrative decisions 
that will negatively affect them.159  All else being equal, agencies 
would prefer not to become mired in legal challenges.  Thus they of-
ten seek to work with, rather than against, business groups, particu-
larly when countervailing organizations are absent or weak and where 
the agency’s actions are unlikely to capture sustained public atten-
tion.160 
Agency officials also often anticipate entering or returning to em-
ployment with the regulated industry once their government service 
terminates.161  As a result, public choice theory posits that they either 
consciously or subconsciously avoid aggressively pressing an agenda 
in opposition to the interests of the regulated industry.  Although this 
 
at 1745–47 (describing how asymmetries in influence and information favor industry over 
public interest groups and individuals). 
159 See Barkow, supra note 153, at 22 (“[R]egulated industries are well-financed and well-
organized, especially when compared to the general  public and public interest groups.  
Industry groups are thus better positioned to monitor agencies closely and to challenge 
any and all agency decisions that will negatively affect them.”); McGarity, supra note 40, at 
1675–76 (“The industry, meanwhile, carefully monitors and frequently interacts with the 
agency as the agency sets its regulatory agenda.”); see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 155, 
at 1298 (“[I]ndustry will have an advantage in monitoring agencies and in setting off 
[fire] alarms when its interests are threatened.”); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups 
in the Rule-Making Process:  Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 245, 252–57 (1998) (“Between 66.7 percent and 100 percent of the comments 
received  were submitted by corporations public utilities, or trade associations.”); 
Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 464 (discussing means by which “regulated industries and 
interest groups with strong central staffs still occupy a favored position in regulatory and 
political structures that allows them an advantage in influencing agency decisions”); 
Wendy E. Wagner et al., Air Toxics in the Board Room:  An Empirical Study of EPA’s Hazardous 
Air Pollutant Rules, 9–10 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 10-01, 2009),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443531 (describing how regulated parties are “heavily en-
gaged—and in a greater proportion than public intrest groups—in attempting to influ-
ence the substance” of the comment process).  See generally Stephen Croley, Theories of 
Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (summariz-
ing studies showing that regulated interests participate to a much greater extent than 
public interest groups). 
160 Barkow, supra note 153, at 22–23.  See also Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest 
Group Participation in Rule Making:  A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
353, 361 (2005) (finding that businesses are participating twice as much as public interest 
groups); Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 464 (“A regulated entity frequently is a large cor-
poration with resources to appeal agency decisions at every level.”). 
161 See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 342 (1986) (discussing “the revolving door” and problems associated with it); 
Christopher N. Camponovo, Indecent Proposal:  Abraham Sofaer, Libya, and the Appearance of 
Impropriety, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 23, 27–29 (1997) (discussing benefits and problems associ-
ated with “the revolving door”); Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, What Do Revolving-Door 
Laws Do?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 421, 421 (2012) (“Plans to pursue a subsequent career in the 
private sector may induce current public employees (for instance, regulators) to treat po-
tential private sector employers favorably.”). 
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“revolving door” theory does not hold up in all contexts—for exam-
ple, an aggressive track record as an enforcer can actually be a useful 
selling point when looking for post-government employment—the 
close affinity between regulators and industry at the very least shapes 
perspectives among policymakers.162 
Finally, wealthy individuals and business organizations wield influ-
ence over government not only through traditional mechanisms of 
“capture” but also through actual responsibility for privatized gov-
ernment functions.163  In countless privatized areas of administration, 
outside firms are hired to administer the laws and programs whose 
substance they have already shaped.164  In addition, in a wide range of 
areas, industry is actually responsible for writing the federal regulato-
ry standards that govern.  Known as “incorporated-by-reference” rules 
or standards, these industry standards are incorporated into law only 
by reference and available to the public only at a charge.165  Through 
both of these mechanisms—private administration of government 
functions and private writing of government regulations—economic 
elites and their organizations thus exercise a degree of direct control, 
as well as indirect influence, over government’s operation. 
In short, business groups and wealthy individuals provide dona-
tions, information, and expertise, populate the ranks of government, 
and work to shape the intellectual and policy debate.  This does not 
mean they “capture” Congress, the President, or the agencies.  Gov-
ernment and government officials still often serve, or try to serve, a 
public interest.166  Countervailing groups still mobilize or try to mobi-
 
162 Compare David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 
530–39 (examining post-employment of prosecutors in the Southern District of New York 
and concluding that prosecutors who go on to private sector careers do not tend to do 
the bidding of those they regulate while in public service) with Law & Long supra note 
161, at 435 (reasoning that future employment hopes may influence public officials to fa-
vor industry). 
163 See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limits of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 895–96 
(2010) (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:  OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)) (“There can be no doubt that 
the last few decades of our nation’s history have seen the privatization of many activities 
that were previously regarded as the preserve of public authority.”). 
164 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 719, 727 (2010) (dis-
cussing the increasing use and effects of privatization and government “workarounds”); 
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 989 (2005) (discussing the degree 
to which the U.S. military has increased the scope and scale of its reliance on private se-
curity companies in recent decades.). 
165 Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to the Law:  The Perplexing Federal Regulatory 
Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 739 (2013). 
166 See Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:  
SPECIAL INTEREST AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 11–12 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 
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lize.167  But business organizations and wealthy individuals are ubiqui-
tous at every step of the process.  They continually check and bal-
ance—or prod and plea with—governmental actors, working to de-
fine the scope of public debate and the shape of governmental policy. 
C.  Organized Wealth in the Parties 
Still, if political parties have replaced the political branches as the 
primary mechanism for political competition, then perhaps none of 
the above matters for constitutional structure.  On this view, the polit-
ical parties provide a distinct mechanism for political competition, a 
mechanism uninfected by, or at least unrelated to, the problems dis-
cussed above.  In reality, however, wealthy individuals and business 
organizations pervade not only the political branches, but also the 
political parties.  Any account of how the parties function as mecha-
nisms of political competition thus must consider the role of money. 
The two major parties in America draw support from different 
segments of the population, often dividing on class lines as well as on 
the basis of geography, race, and age.168  Yet both parties obtain most 
of their donations from “the richest communities.”169  And the lead-
ers, nominees, and appointees from both parties are themselves 
overwhelmingly wealthy, with deep connections to corporations and 
the financial sector.170 
 
2014) (distinguishing between “strong capture,” which is uncommon, and “weak cap-
ture,” which is ubiquitous). 
167 DRUTMAN, supra note 5, at 43–44. 
168 See Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans without Constraint:  Political Polarization 
and Trends in American Public Opinion 114 AM. J. SOC. 408, 440 (2008) (noting “the persis-
tent importance of traditional social cleavages of class, race, and religiosity in determin-
ing voting behavior”); Andrew Gelman et al., Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the 
United States, 5 SOC. SCI. Q. 1203, 1204 (2010) (describing partisan differences in voting 
by income). 
169 James G. Gimpel et al., The Political Geography of Campaign Contributions in American Politics, 
68 J. POL. 626, 629–30 (2006) (“[B]oth parties turn to the richest communities in the 
country for the bulk of their itemized contributions, and the wealthiest citizens provide 
those funds far out of proportion to their share of the population.”). 
170 See, e.g., Matt O’Brien & Darla Cameron, Elizabeth Warren Was Right:  The Links Between 
Citigroup and Government Run Deep, THE WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/16/elizabeth-warren-
was-right-the-links-between-citigroup-and-government-run-deep/ (noting that seven high-
level officials in Democratic administrations have worked at Citigroup before or after 
their government service).  Even the recent Tea Party Movement, self-avowedly populist 
in nature, was funded in large part by billionaires.  See Frank Rich, The Billionaires Bankroll-
ing the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at WK8 (discussing the “sugar daddies who are 
bankrolling” the American Tea Party). 
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Meanwhile, contemporary political parties lack a grass-roots struc-
ture that facilitates participation by ordinary Americans.  Today’s po-
litical parties are relatively skeletal organizations, particularly as com-
pared to political parties in most other countries and to our own 
parties at other points in history.171  They do not, for example, require 
regular payment of party dues or other forms of participation.172  In-
stead, party membership usually means simply checking a box on a 
voter registration card.  Progressive Era reforms, such as the state-
imposed requirement that political parties select nominees through 
primary elections, along with (salutary) prohibitions against political 
patronage, have weakened mechanisms that parties previously used 
to encourage rank-and-file participation.173  Indeed, today, at the na-
tional level, the formal parties function primarily as campaign service 
vendors and fundraising entities.174  And as the influence of Super 
PACs and other large-donor entities has increased within the ecosys-
tems of the parties writ-large, the role of party activists and formal 
party leadership structures has declined.175 
Not only are the active participants and funders of the two politi-
cal parties wealthy, but on economic redistribution issues, these vot-
ers tend to agree, at least more so than the standard narrative sug-
gests.  Recent empirical work demonstrates that elite Americans place 
a much lower value on equality than other Americans, even when 
they self-identify as progressive Democrats.176 
Relatedly, there is less space between the parties—or key segments 
therein—than the standard account in the separation-of-powers liter-
 
171 See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 144–47 (1986) (compar-
ing American party organizations with other countries and addressing evolution of Amer-
ican parties over time). 
172 Id. at 144–46. 
173 See Pildes, supra note 39, at 813, n.21 (describing doctrinal changes that led to these re-
forms and arguing that the result was a rise in political fragmentation and a decline of 
control by party leaders). 
174 Andrias, supra note 117, at 48–49 (citing Daniel J. Galvin, The Transformation of Political 
Institutions:  Investments in Institutional Resources and Gradual Change in the National Party 
Committees, 26 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 50, 52, 57–59 (2012)). 
175 See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over:  McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, 
and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 176–77 (2015) (discussing the 
growing financial role of Super PACs and shadow party groups and how these “outside 
groups have taken over many of [the official parties’] functions”).  On the parties as eco-
systems, with different power centers, nodes of influence, and multiple points of entry, 
see generally Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties:  Groups, Policy Demands and 
Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012) and Michael S. Kang, The 
Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131 (2005). 
176 Raymond Fisman et al., The Distributional Preferences of an Elite, 349 SCIENCE 1300, 1300 
(2015), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/349/6254/aab0096.full. 
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ature would suggest.  In the legal literature, the account is of two 
highly ideological and cohesive political parties, representing two 
ideological poles.  One party is liberal, the other conservative, with 
great difference between them.177  Recent political science scholar-
ship shows that, in fact, party polarization has been asymmetric and 
uneven, particularly on economic issues.  Rising inequality is a major 
factor in this asymmetric polarization.178  Behavioral changes have 
largely been driven by the re-positioning of the Republican Party, 
with House Republicans in particular moving dramatically to the 
Right since the 1970s, a period during which economic inequality has 
increased.179  During this same period, congressional Democrats as a 
group have moved only slightly to the left, and the shift has occurred 
largely because of the disappearance of conservative Southern “Blue 
Dog” Democrats.  Those Democrats remaining in office and their 
successors have not themselves shifted substantially left, particularly 
on economic issues.180  Meanwhile the Democratic platform has at 
least episodically moved away from “general welfare issues to issues 
based on ascriptive characteristics (race, gender, and sexual prefer-
ence) of individuals.”181 
More importantly for this Article’s focus, both parties have shifted 
toward more neoliberal economic policies or market conservatism.182  
 
177 Legal scholars who focus on partisanship tend to describe the parties as fierce and equal 
contenders, representing two poles of public opinion.  See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra 
note 9, at 2332–38 (“Partisan competition in government now means a Democratic Party 
dominated by liberals, with few moderates and no conservatives, pitted against a Republi-
can Party dominated by conservatives, with few moderates and no liberals.”). 
178 See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 93, at 71–109 (advancing income inequality as a major 
factor in polarization). 
179 Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENTS IN POLITICS 19, 21 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013); Nolan 
McCarty, et al., Polarization is Real (and Asymmetric), THE MONKEY CAGE (May 15, 2012), 
http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric/.  On the move 
of the Republican Party to the right, see JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-
ALL POLITICS:  HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON 
THE MIDDLE CLASS 171 (2010); MANN & ORENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51–56. 
180 McCarty, et al., supra note 179. 
181 MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 93, at 11.  Among other explanations for the shifting focus of 
the Democratic Party is the transformation of the labor movement, beginning in the 
1940s, from a broad based social movement focused on the state to an interest group fo-
cused on private collective bargaining.  See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collec-
tive Bargaining:  Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE 
RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930–1980, at 122, 122–52 (Steve Fraser & Gary 
Gerstle eds., 1989) (examining trade unions, labor, and the role of Progressives in gener-
ating reform for growing inequalities in power and income). 
182 See, e.g., Bonica et al., supra note 97, at 104, 106–07.  The “slight liberal drift” of the Dem-
ocrats has been “compositional in nature,” with moderate Democrats from the South be-
ing replaced by conservative Democrats.  Id. at 106.  Meanwhile, both parties have experi-
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As political scientists Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and various co-
authors have shown in a series of studies, while the Democrats are still 
more closely allied with labor and lower-income voters, both parties 
have experienced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a “form of 
free market capitalism” which offers “less support for government 
provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates, and deregulation.”183  
Though to different extents, for the last several decades, key seg-
ments of both parties have shared the view that the primary job of 
government is to protect financial markets and financial interests.184  
To be sure, there are substantial differences between the positions of 
the Democratic and Republican Parties on economic and social wel-
fare issues, and these positions continue to evolve, with Democratic 
leaders showing renewed interest in populist policies over the last 
couple of years.  But the scope of that disagreement is different than 
the dominant story of hyper-polarization would suggest. 
Moreover, because of our constitutional structure, wealthy inter-
ests need only exercise a degree of bipartisan influence to serve as an 
effective check on government:  They need only exercise sufficient 
influence across the parties to be able to exploit critical veto points.185  
Accordingly, business interests, in particular, tend to contribute stra-
tegically to members of both parties in order to obtain influence over 
key chokeholds.186  Studies on the campaign activity of the financial 
 
enced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a “form of free market capitalism” which 
offers “less support for government provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates, and 
deregulation.”  Id. at 104.  For discussion of Democratic and Republican party shifts in 
recent years, see generally HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179; MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 
93; Thomas Byrne Edsall, The Changing Shape of Power:  A Realignment in Public Policy in 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930–1980, at 269–70 (Steve Fraser & Gary 
Gerstle eds., 1989) (“The past twenty years, in effect, produced a policy realignment in 
the absence of a political realignment.  The major beneficiaries of this policy realignment 
are the affluent, while those in the bottom half of the income distribution, particularly 
those whose lives are the most economically marginal, have reaped the fewest rewards.”). 
183 See, e.g., Bonica et al., supra note 97, at 104, 106–07. 
184 See Edsall, supra note 182, at 270–71; James K. Galbraith, The Surrender of Economic Policy, 
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/surrender-
economic-policy (“Across the spectrum, all declare the main job of government is to help 
markets work well.”). 
185 For an account of parties as ecosystems, with different power centers, nodes of influence, 
and multiple points of entry, see Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends 
That Matter for Party Politics 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 35 (2014) (citing Kang, supra 
note 175 and Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties:  Groups, Policy Demands and 
Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012)). 
186 See Phillip Bump, Democrats Who Voted For the Cromnibus Have Received Twice as Much Money 
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industry illustrate the dynamic:  Financial industry members contrib-
ute in great numbers and great amounts to political campaigns of 
candidates from both parties.  But they target money where it is likely 
to have the most influence.  They give, in particular, to members on 
the Financial Services Committee of both parties, who are likely to set 
the legislative agenda, and they give to the more economically con-
servative wings of each party, who are most aligned with the policy 
positions of the industry.187 
Historical and empirical work regarding the relative positions of 
Democrats and Republicans on measures designed to ameliorate ine-
quality and regulate business confirms the success of the strategy:  
Through money and organization, wealth has been able to eliminate, 
from decisive sectors of both political parties, support for redistribu-
tive measures and greater regulation of the corporate sector.188  
Though the Democratic Party and Republican Party advance oppos-
ing positions on many economic issues, key members do not, particu-
larly with regard to low-salience issues of concern to organized busi-
ness.  The parties diverge substantially, but wealth influences enough 
members of both parties to narrow the effective gap in practice. 
D.  A Coda: Outcomes for Governance 
While it is clear that economic elites and large business organiza-
tions pervade the political parties and the political branches, it is 
harder to measure how precisely their participation affects outputs.  
Political theorists have long worried that “those with greater property 
 
no-voters (discussing strategic donations by the finance industry); AMERICANS FOR 
CAMPAIGN REFORM, MONEY IN POLITICS:  WHO GIVES (2010), http://www.acrreform.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Fact-Sheet-Who-Gives.pdf (finding that, in the 2010 elec-
tion cycle, “[i]ndustry giving to the two major political parties was roughly even across 
sectors”). 
187 See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLITICAL BUBBLES:  FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE FAILURE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83–85 (2013). 
188 See, e.g., Carnes, supra note 98, at 19–21 (exploring data that show the relationship be-
tween socioeconomic status and legislation); Edsall, supra note 182, at 270 (discussing 
policy realignment and its affect on different socioeconomic classes).  The recent vote on 
the Cromnibus bill provides a vivid example.  See supra note 186 (describing greater total 
campaign contributions for Democrats who voted for a spending bill than Democrats who 
did not).  For a discussion of the ways in which wealth influences the conservative legisla-
tive agenda, see Jane Mayer, Covert Operations:  The Billion Brothers Who are Waging a War 
Against Obama, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, at 45–46, 55 (discussing the growing po-
litical influence of the Koch brothers); Peter Hamby, Company Men:  The U.S. Chamber 
Flexes Its New Political Muscle, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/politics/
hamby-midterms-chamber-tea-party (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (describing the increasing 
influence of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
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and wealth” would capture “the electoral process to their ad-
vantage.”189  Earlier empirical work provided only sporadic support 
for this notion, with some prominent scholars concluding that gov-
ernment outcomes favoring the wealthy cannot be explained by a 
failure of democratic responsiveness.  Rather, poor Americans, like 
their wealthy counterparts, simply did not favor downward redistribu-
tion or restrictions on corporate power.190 
More recent empirical research, however, provides substantial 
support for theorists’ concerns that government is ultimately more 
responsive to both wealthy individuals and organizations representing 
business interests.  Most notably, in a recent study of two decades of 
congressional lawmaking, Martin Gilens found that “under most cir-
cumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of Americans appear 
to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does 
or doesn’t adopt.”191  Other researchers’ work in the last few years 
confirms these conclusions.192 
The extent to which the views of wealthy Americans diverge from 
those of lower-income Americans is disputed.  On many issues there 
appears to be little divergence.  But recent studies suggest that the 
general public is more amenable than the wealthy to a variety of poli-
cies designed to reduce inequality and strengthen economic oppor-
tunity, including raising the minimum wage, increasing the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, providing greater unemployment benefits, and 
directly creating jobs.193  For example, only 40% of the wealthy think 
 
189 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 360 (1993); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 310 (1983) (“The most common form 
of powerlessness in the United States today derives from the dominance of money in the 
spehere of politics.”).  For a discussion of this strand of political theory, see Sachs, supra 
note 26, at 159–60 (2013). 
190 See generally JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, WHAT’S FAIR?:  AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1981) (finding, through qualitative interviews, significant ambiva-
lence among working-class Americans about downward redistribution).  For an overview 
of these debates, see WHO GETS REPRESENTED? (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien, 
eds., 2011); Jennifer Hochschild, Winner-Take-All Politics:  A Review Essay, 126 POL. SCI. Q. 
315, 318 (2011) (reviewing JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL 
POLITICS:  HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE 
MIDDLE CLASS (2010)). 
191 MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 1 (2012). 
192 See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
NEW GILDED AGE (2008); CALLAHAN & MIJIN CHA supra, note 98; GILENS, supra note 191; 
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90. 
193 See generally Benjamin I. Page, et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 
11 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 51-73 (2013) (comparing preferences of wealthy Americans 
with lower-income Americans).  Affluent voters are also less supportive of labor unions 
and less likely to support laws that make it easier for workers to join unions.  See JOHN 
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the minimum wage should be high enough to prevent full-time work-
ers from living in poverty, while 78% of the general public holds this 
view.194  A similar gap exists with regard to tax policy:  A recent study 
found that 73% of Americans making under $20,000 believed that 
the gap between rich and poor should be reduced, even if achieving 
that goal requires higher taxes, compared to 54% of Americans mak-
ing over $100,000.195  Even where the wealthy, middle class, and poor 
agree on policy, they prioritize differently.  Polls over the past several 
years have repeatedly found that addressing unemployment, creating 
jobs, and improving the economy are priorities for lower-income 
Americans, while higher-income Americans rank reducing the deficit 
as their top priority.196 
Irrespective of the degree of divergence in views, when divergence 
occurs, members of Congress tend to respond to the views of wealthy 
individuals, from whom they regularly hear, as opposed to those of 
lower- and middle-income Americans, who participate much less and 
do so with less money and organization.197  For example, Gilens’s 
study found that federal legislators “consistently appear to pay no at-
tention to the views of millions of constituents in the bottom third of 
the income distribution.”198  When preferences between the rich and 
the poor diverge, “government policy bears absolutely no relationship 
to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”199  Even 
when middle-class preferences align with those of the poor, Congress 
is responsive to the affluent and not to the poor and middle classes.200 
 
HALPIN & KARL AGNE, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, STATE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY, 2009:  A NATIONAL STUDY OF POLITICAL VALUES AND BELIEFS 30 (2009), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/
political_ideology.pdf (finding “attitudes toward unions are closely tied to education, with 
college-educated Americans of every ideology being 6-to-12 points less likely to agree” 
that unions are important).  The affluent are also significantly less inclined than other 
groups of Americans to support an active role for government in addressing mass unem-
ployment.  Enns & Wlezien, supra note 190. 
194 CALLAHAN & MIJIN CHA, supra note 98, at 5. 
195 Id. at 4. 
196 Id. at 5–6, nn.6–8 (collecting polls).  Results of a pilot study of the Survey of Economically 
Successful Americans (“SESA”) showed that 87% of affluent households believed budget 
deficits were a “very important” problem, the highest percentage of all listed problems.  
Page et al., supra note 193, at 54. 
197 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 6. 
198 BARTELS, supra note 192, at 282. 
199 GILENS, supra note 191, at 81. 
200 Id. at 84.  Gilens concluded that representational inequality is genuinely rooted in eco-
nomic inequality and cannot be reduced to partisan bias, and he noted the dwarfing of 
small donations by affluent donors to political campaigns.  Id. at 247–48. 
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Business organizations similarly affect legislative outcomes. Gilens 
and Page found that organizations representing business in govern-
ance are relatively cohesive in their positions on economic policy 
questions in ways that correlate negatively with the preferences of av-
erage citizens.201  And, along with their wealthy owners and leaders, 
business groups substantially affect legislative outcomes, whereas the 
scant groups representing ordinary citizens have little aggregate ef-
fect.202  This should not be surprising given that, as previously dis-
cussed, the composition of the U.S. interest groups is heavily tilted 
toward corporations and business associations and business groups 
are by far more active and better funded.203  And the trends hold no 
matter which party is in power.204  The related data on economic dis-
tribution is consistent:  Inequality has increased more quickly during 
Republican administrations,205 but it has also increased during peri-
ods of Democratic control.206  And the gap has widened during both 
divided and unified government.207 
Wealthy interests also shape regulatory outcomes, though here 
the role of business is far greater than that of wealthy individuals.  
Agency responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being 
regulated is well modeled as a theoretical matter and well document-
ed as an empirical matter.208  As Richard Stewart has observed, “[i]t 
 
201 Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 574. 
202 Id. at 572. 
203 Id. at 574–75; see also supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text.  Gilens and Page’s re-
search is consistent with prior studies showing a clear bias in legislative outcomes to the 
wealthy.  E.g., BARTELS, supra note 192; FRANK BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND 
POLICY CHANGE:  WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY (2009). 
204 GILENS, supra note 191, at 178; Gilens & Page, supra note 5, at 573–74. 
205 Scholars attribute this to differences in macroeconomic and tax-and-transfer policies.  See 
BARTELS, supra note 192, at 31–34, 104–05 (citing and extending the research in 
DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY:  MACROECONOMICS AND 
ELECTORAL POLITICS (1987) and Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Christopher Dennis, Income Dis-
tribution in the United States, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 467–90 (1988), which indicates Republi-
can macroeconomic policies are the culprit, and citing EDWARD R. TUFTE, POLITICAL 
CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY (1978) as confirmation of the effects of Republican transfer 
policies). 
206 See Lane Kenworthy, How Much Do Presidents Influence Income Inequality? 53 CHALLENGE 90, 
92–96, 103–08 (2010) (reviewing Bartels’s research but finding that inequality has also in-
creased under Democratic administrations since the 1970s).  Notably, the relationship be-
tween the President’s party and patterns of income growth weakened considerably after 
the 1970s when the organizational landscape of American politics shifted.  Since the 
1970s, income inequality has risen sharply and the correlation between the President’s 
party and movement in inequality has been much weaker than in earlier years.  Id. at 107. 
207 Id. at 92. 
208 See ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION:  AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL 
PROPOSALS:  A STAFF PAPER 99–100 (1971) (explaining that capture happens most often 
when an agency assigns undue weight to the interests of the regulated industries as 
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has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but 
by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency 
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or 
client interests in the process of agency decisionmaking results in a 
persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.”209  That is not to say 
agencies fail to regulate in the public interest at all, but they often 
become closely identified with and dependent on the industries they 
are charged with regulating.210  Several different researchers find sys-
tematic biases that favor regulated parties in rules promulgated by 
several different agencies.  The bias exists even in agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that are generally viewed 
as resistant to traditional forms of agency capture.211  Of course, it is 
sometimes hard to identify when an agency decision is the product of 
undue interest group pressure as opposed to an exercise of the agen-
 
against those of the public); Croley, supra note 126, at 5 (describing the concept of agen-
cy capture as an essential component of the public-choice theory of regulatory process, 
which maintains that agencies cater to the regulatory needs of well-organized interest 
groups).  For helpful overviews of capture, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN 
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); Bagley & Revesz, supra note 155, at 1260; Stewart, 
supra note 151; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
209 Stewart, supra note 151, at 1713 quoted in Barkow, supra note 153, at 21–22; see also Stewart, 
supra note 151, at 1685 (“At its crudest, this thesis is based on the ‘capture’ scenario, in 
which administrations are systematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by the business 
firms within their orbit of responsibility, whether regulatory or promotional.”).  For cases 
discussing regulatory capture, see, for example, Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 
483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that “regulatory agencies are subject to the phenomenon 
known as ‘agency capture’”); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir. 
1988) (describing agency capture as the “undesirable scenario where the regulated indus-
try gains influence over the regulators, and the regulators end up serving the interests of 
the industry, rather than the general public”). 
210 Merrill, supra note 33, at 1060 (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79–94 (1955)). 
211 Martino Golden, supra note 126 (studying rules promulgated by federal agencies using 
content analysis to determine private citizen comment participation and organized influ-
ences on federal regulations and finding no citizen group engagement in five of eight 
rules promulgated by EPA); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade:  An Empirical 
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 108–09 (2011) (citing 
Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation:  A Statistical Analysis of 
EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175, 178, 187 (1992)) (examining interest group 
engagement in pesticide registrations between 1975 and 1989 and finding environmen-
talists participated in forty-nine percent of the cancellations); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan 
Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureau-
cracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 131, 133 (2006) (studying forty lower-salience rulemakings promul-
gated by four different federal agencies and finding that business interests submitted 57% 
of the comments, whereas nongovernmental organizations submitted 22% of comments, 
only 6% of which were submitted by public interest groups). 
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cy’s independent judgment.212  But notwithstanding limitations of 
public choice theory, there is little dispute that, overall, organized 
business and wealthy interests participate at far greater rates than 
others, and with significant effect. 
III.  ASSESSING THE “FIFTH BRANCH”:  THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZED 
WEALTH ON EXECUTIVE POWER AND LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY 
The focus thus far has been on the extent to which wealth influ-
ences the political branches, the political parties, and the executive 
branch bureaucracy.  This Part builds on that analysis, demonstrating 
that existing descriptive accounts of executive and legislative power 
need revision.  It shows that because of the influence of wealth on a 
host of important issues, unified government is more constrained in 
its output than dominant constitutional theories suggest; gridlock is 
more biased in its operation and results; and internal checks are less 
effective at diffusing concentrated power and enabling innovation 
than proponents assert. 
To be clear, the partisanship story dominant in the law review errs 
not because it expressly asserts hyper-polarization on economic mat-
ters.  Rather, the literature typically speaks in generic terms about in-
tense polarization, without considering the role of wealth.  That is, 
those who write about government dysfunction frequently evoke par-
tisanship in expansive terms without drilling down into where and 
when issues are polarized—and where and when they are not.  In the 
words of one recent piece, “In our highly polarized system, it some-
times seems like we disagree on everything.”213 
The number of recent articles invoking hyper-polarization or in-
tense partisanship as the cause of government dysfunction, without 
 
212 See, e.g., Protecting the Public Interest:  Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture:  Hearing Be-
fore the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 111th Cong. 6–7 (2010) (statement 
of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Michigan Law Sch.) (“Capture 
is . . . often very hard, if not impossible, to reliably identify.”).  Public choice theory can 
be taken too far.  Theorists err to the extent they define the legislative process as merely 
an arena for fundamentally self-serving behavior or to the extent they fail to recognize 
the plurality of interests and motivations at play.  For critiques of public choice theory of 
regulation, see generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY:  A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994); Mark 
Kelman, On Democracy Bashing:  A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of 
the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth An-
derson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:  Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic 
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990). 
213 Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 57, 96 (2014). 
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qualification, is significant.214  And where the constitutional govern-
ance literature does recognize that wealthy interest groups and cam-
paign money play a role in shaping partisanship, and in shaping gov-
ernance, it tends to treat the dynamic as an exception to the basic 
rule, rather than as a systemic feature.215  Meanwhile, although some 
theorists have recognized that actors both internal and external to 
the government check partisan government—actors such as the me-
dia, watchdog groups, and foreign governments216—even these ac-
counts tend not to consider the systematic role played by wealthy in-
terests.217  As shown below, the picture drawn is incomplete.218 
A.  Unified Government 
A central preoccupation of separation of powers and administra-
tive law scholars is the growth of executive power over the last centu-
 
214 For just a few recent examples, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2015) (describing “intense political polarization and partisan 
disagreement over policy” as leading to nonenforcement); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 235 (2015) (claiming our “age of divided and polarized govern-
ment” has made it more difficult for the executive branch to respond to challenges with 
new legislation and identifying “pooling” of administrative resources as a tool to address 
those challenges). 
215 Levinson and Pildes, for example, contend that association with a “party is likely to be the 
single best predictor of political agreement and disagreement.”  Levinson & Pildes, supra 
note 9, at 2324–25.  And although they concede that “[o]n certain aspects of trade and 
environmental policy, for example, the relevant cleavages may correspond more closely 
to geography and interest-group support than to party,” id. at 2324, they treat the role of 
organized business interests on those issues as an unusual exception from the rule.  Gilli-
an Metzger acknowledges that economic inequality has helped contribute to polarization, 
but she too emphasizes that “[t]he signal characteristic of national politics today is in-
creasing political polarization.”  Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judi-
cial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1610, 1630–31 (2015). 
216 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT:  THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11 (2012); ERIC A POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011); Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 549 (2000). 
217 But see Michaels, supra note 164, at 719 (describing various privatization practices as “ex-
ecutive aggrandizing”). 
218 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for example, use financial reform as a key example of 
how the executive is unconstrained by inter- and intra-branch checks, but checked by po-
litical forces.  But they fail to consider the distribution of political power with respect to 
financial regulation.  They point to the importance of whistleblowers, and general politi-
cal backlash, barely mentioning the outsized role money plays in government.  Perhaps 
for this reason, they are much more sanguine about the effectiveness of existing checks.  
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 216; cf. GOLDSMITH, supra note 216 (describing vari-
ous forms of watching and checking the presidency in the form of courts, members of 
Congress, human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, watchdog groups, whistleblowers, 
and others in the context of the war on terror). 
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ry.  Supporters of a strong, unitary executive celebrate the trend.  
They contend that the Constitution creates a hierarchical executive 
branch, with the President empowered to direct administration of all 
federal laws.219  Others are less convinced that the Constitution’s text 
compels a strongly unitary executive, but assert that a powerful Exec-
utive is permissible, when authorized by Congress, and necessary to 
respond to exigencies of modern life.  These theorists celebrate the 
distinct capacities of the executive:  the ability to access vast amounts 
of information, act quickly and decisively, and adapt to changing cir-
cumstances.  Numerous scholars, along with many Presidents and ex-
ecutive branch lawyers, advance this view.220  A third group worries in-
tensely about the rise of executive power, arguing that expanded 
presidential authority poses a grave threat to the future of the United 
States’ government.221 
As a positive matter, however, there is little dispute:  Our execu-
tive has expanded greatly since the Founding, and particularly so in 
recent years.222  Scholars point to partisanship as one explanation for 
why executive power has so expanded:  During times of unified party 
government, the executive, beholden to a highly polarized and ideo-
logically coherent party, pushes an aggressive, politically extreme leg-
islative agenda.  Congress is not only willing to enact partisan policy, 
 
219 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550 (1994) (rejecting the theory that the concept of a unitary ex-
ecutive stemming from the Framers is a myth).  For a history of the unitary executive the-
ory, see generally Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power:  A 
Developmental Perspective of the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009). 
220 For a recent and particularly robust expression of this view, see generally POSNER & 
VERMEULE, supra note 216.  Others who emphasize the capacity of the Executive to re-
spond to modern exigencies include Kagan, supra note 53, at 2255–56; Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1994). 
221 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3.  See also PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE:  HOW 
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009) (arguing that presidents’ 
increasingly assertive claims to unilateral authority have subverted constitutional checks 
and balances). 
222 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 120 (“[T]oday, both major parties are in love with the 
presidency.”); Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1384 
(2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (“Thus, presidential power expanded through 
liberal hands for most of the century, and just as liberals began to have second thoughts, 
conservatives propelled the expanding presidency further.”).  At the same time, Jerry 
Mashaw has demonstrated the degree to which the administrative state preceded the New 
Deal.  JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION:  THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (2012) (“[T]here has been no pre-
cipitous fall from a historical position of separation-of-powers grace to a position of com-
promise; there is not a new administrative constitution whose legitimacy should be un-
derstood as not only contestable but deeply problematic.”). 
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but is more likely to delegate power to a fellow partisan and is unlike-
ly to check abuses of that power.  As a result, across administrations, 
during periods of unified government, the administrative state ex-
pands and the executive operates with few checks.223 
The problem is that this account is essentially undifferentiated.  It 
speaks about presidential power and hyper-polarization in general 
terms.  As a result, it implies that partisanship explains government 
action across issue domains, and that executive power’s expansion is 
trans-substantive.  As discussed in Part II, however, polarization has 
been asymmetrical between the parties and uneven across issues.224  
Because of organized wealth’s systematic influence, executive power 
on a host of issues is more constrained, or differently constrained, 
than partisanship-focused law review literature on executive power 
would suggest. 
The constraints imposed on unified government by wealth should 
be evident from Part II.  Through campaign donations, lobbying, and 
participation throughout the bureaucracy and administrative process, 
wealthy individuals, businesses, and their organizations effectively 
check governmental efforts that oppose their interests, even during 
periods of unified government.  And, indeed, empirical research sug-
gests that proposals contrary to business interests, advanced during 
periods of unified government, have fared particularly poorly.  Dem-
ocratic administrations, which have pushed such proposals more fre-
quently, thus appear to fare worse in terms of legislative output dur-
ing periods of unified government.225 
Recent experience illustrates the point:  When, during the first 
years of the Obama Administration, both the executive and legislative 
branches were controlled by Democrats—with a filibuster-proof ma-
jority in the Senate—the parties-not-powers theory would suggest that 
we should have seen a great deal of legislation, easily passed.  Accord-
ing to the theory, such legislation should have expanded the power of 
the executive immensely and should have advanced a hyper-partisan 
 
223 WILLIAM HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION:  THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL 
ACTION 179–80 (2003).  For legal scholarship discussing this trend, see Bradley & Morri-
son, supra note 54, at 443; Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2348–49; Marshall, supra 
note 49, at 519; Pildes, supra note 2, at 326, 333. 
224 See supra Part II.C. 
225 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE:  WHY POLITICAL PARTIES DON’T KILL THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 66, 78–79 (2011).  David Mayhew has found that during unified 
government Republican presidents have a 71.4% probability of success with high-priority 
proposals, compared with Democrats’ 42.1%, though he has advised against 
overinterpreting the data.  Id. at 79. 
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liberal agenda.226  To some extent, that account holds up:  The legis-
lative achievements that preceded the Democrats’ loss of Congress in 
2010, primarily healthcare reform and financial regulatory reform, 
were significant progressive reforms.  They also were politically polar-
izing and involved substantial new delegations to the executive 
branch. 
But when one considers the entire process of enactment, as well as 
the legislation championed but not passed during the preceding po-
litical campaign, the picture is more complicated.  Both the 
healthcare and financial reform laws were far harder to enact than 
the model offered by separation-of-parties scholars would have sug-
gested.  And the multiple veto gates that made enactment difficult 
systematically favored organized wealth, particularly regulated indus-
try.  Of course, wealthy interests were not the only groups involved in 
the governance process and wealthy individuals and groups were not 
monolithic in their views.  But money served to constrain in ways that 
undermine, or at least amend, the narrative of an unchecked and hy-
per-partisan executive during times of unified government. 
Consider the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act.  Signed into law in July of 2010, Dodd-Frank included “a 
package of financial regulatory reforms unparalleled in scope and 
depth since the New Deal.”227  A reaction to regulatory failings 
brought to light by the most severe financial crisis since the Great 
Depression,228 the Act was politically possible not only because of 
popular anger at the banks, but also because of unified government.  
But this is only part of the story.  Despite both unified Democratic 
government and strong popular support, passing the legislation was 
immensely challenging.  Moreover, the content of the legislation was 
systematically influenced by economic elites and business interests 
and, particularly in areas of low-light, this influence was largely un-
checked by countervailing forces. 
Financiers exercised their influence through multiple channels, 
consistent with the mechanisms described in Part II.  For example, 
leading up to the writing of the legislation, they were more active in 
 
226 To be clear, my argument does not rest on the notion that the Democratic Party is inher-
ently liberal and that it somehow abandoned its true mission.  Rather, my claim is simply 
that the narrative of hyper-polarization erroneously implies an ideological divide that in 
practice either does not always exist or does not always produce the division of powers as-
serted. 
227 Heath P. Tarbert, The Dodd-Frank Act-Two Years Later, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 373, 
373 (2012). 
228 Id. 
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politics than the average American.229  In particular, they were sub-
stantially more likely to contribute to ongoing campaigns, including, 
on occasion, through coordinated campaigns.230  Their contributions 
flowed to members of both political parties, as they targeted key 
Democrats while rewarding staunch Republican supporters.231  Fol-
lowing up on their campaign contributions, the industry spent a great 
amount of time and money lobbying.  Meanwhile, Congress heard 
much less from consumers and their representatives—not surprising-
ly, for the issues were technically complex and consumer groups were 
comparatively smaller and less resourced.232  Meanwhile, past leaders 
of finance filled many of the relevant leadership positions of both the 
outgoing Bush Administration and the new Obama Administration. 
Ultimately, although the banks were not able to stop Dodd-
Frank’s enactment, they were successful at limiting its reforms.  This 
occurred despite an executive governing with a strong majority in 
Congress.233  In areas of low-light, the banks’ checks and prods were 
particularly strong.  For example, following the enactment of Dodd-
Frank, Citigroup played a significant role in drafting a bill to exempt 
broad swathes of trades from new regulation.  The bank’s recom-
mendations were reflected in more than seventy lines of the House 
committee’s eighty-five-line bill.  As The New York Times reported, 
“[t]wo crucial paragraphs, prepared by Citigroup in conjunction with 
other Wall Street banks, were copied nearly word for word.”234 
 
229 Eighty-eight percent of those employed in finance and insurance reported voting in the 
presidential election compared to 76% of other respondents.  They were also more likely 
to try to influence the votes of others, attend a campaign meeting, rally or speech, and 
work on a campaign.  MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187, at 78–83 (2013). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 83–85. 
232 Id. at 78–80. 
233 See Daniel Indiviglio, 5 Ways Lobbyists Influenced the Dodd-Frank Bill, THE ATLANTIC (July 5, 
2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/5-ways-lobbyists-
influenced-the-dodd-frank-bill/59137/ (confirming the “watered-down” nature of the fi-
nal Volcker Rule).  Whether or not the original Volcker Rule would have been better pol-
icy, the bill simply does not reflect unchecked power of unified government.  Rather, 
bank lobbyists played a major role in the shaping of the legislation, with little counter-
balance from consumers.  MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187, at 186–87, 253; see also Kim-
berly D. Krawiec & Guangya Liu, Pointless Pluralism?  An Empirical Study of Volcker Rulemak-
ing (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (undertaking a case study of the 
Volcker Rule and concluding that industry representation in formulation of rule domi-
nated). 
234 Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (May 23, 2013 9:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/banks-
lobbyists-help-in-drafting-financial-bills (adding that “[l]awmakers changed two words to 
make them plural”). 
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Again, the point is not that the Dodd-Frank Act falls short of 
achieving its stated ambitions or that it fails to reform the industry in 
a way that will prevent future crises—many experts take that position, 
while others emphasize the important achievements of the Act.235  Ra-
ther, whatever the final Act’s strengths or failings, what is important 
from a separation-of-powers perspective is that, throughout the law-
making process, the financial industry provided substantial and sys-
tematic constraint on unified government, particularly on more 
technical issues of low-light, checking and prodding its actions.  
Meanwhile, countervailing voices of consumers were much fainter 
and more diffuse. 
The story of healthcare reform similarly reflects the imposition of 
checks by regulated industry on the actions of unified government.  
According to nearly all observers, industry priorities fundamentally 
structured the healthcare reform bill.  At every step in the legislative 
process, participation by business interests outweighed that of con-
sumers.236  And administration officials were frank that, in their view, 
the bill’s ultimate success would depend largely on support from the 
relevant business interests, including the insurance and pharmaceuti-
cal industries.237 To be clear, the healthcare bill was a significant, even 
historic, progressive achievement.  But the persistent influence of 
wealth, particularly business groups, demonstrates the degree to 
which unified government is checked—from a particular direction. 
 
235 See, e.g., MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187, at 253–54 (explaining that holes and uncertain-
ties remain, despite the Dodd-Frank Act’s new provisions); Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishna-
murthy, Regulating Against Bubbles:  How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall 
Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1542, 1544, 1629–30 (2015) (assert-
ing that the Dodd-Frank Act is ineffective in achieving its goals); Saule T. Omarova, The 
Dodd-Frank Act:  A New Deal for A New Age?, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 83, 84–85 (2011) (claim-
ing that the Dodd-Frank Act falls short of its “stated ambitions”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
The Dodd-Frank Act:  A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. 
REV. 951, 954 (2011) (asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act fails in its promise to prevent fu-
ture taxpayer-funded bailouts). 
236 For discussion of the politics of the bill’s passage see, for example, LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & 
THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS:  WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW 7 (2010); JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED:  WHY THE US HAS NO 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (2005); Elenora E. Connors & Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Health Care Reform—A Historic Moment in U.S. Social Policy 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2521–22 
(2010); Arthur Daemmrich, U.S. Healthcare Reform and the Pharmaceutical Industry 15 (Har-
vard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-015, 2011), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/
Publication%20Files/12-015.pdf;; Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health 
Care Uniquely Inefficient? 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27 (2008); Jill Quadagno, Interest-Group 
Influence on the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010:  Winners and Losers in the 
Health Care Reform Debate, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 449, 449 (2011). 
237 Jonathan Cohn, How They Did It, NEW REPUBLIC (May 21, 2010), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/75077/how-they-did-it. 
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Moreover, to the extent these two high-profile pieces of legislation 
support the partisanship theory of the separation of powers—and 
they do to a point—they are atypical.  Despite the presence of a su-
per-majority during President Barack Obama’s first year, there were 
few legislative accomplishments on policies aimed at reducing ine-
quality or otherwise opposed by wealthy interests.  This includes poli-
cies championed by the formal platform of the Democratic Party, the 
Obama campaign, and the Obama Administration.238  For example, 
President Obama campaigned on proposals to cap executive com-
pensation, raise and index the minimum wage, and make the tax 
code more progressive.  Yet proposals to rein in executive pay were 
“largely symbolic and fleeting, focused on companies that had taken 
bailout money and not yet repaid it”;239 and the minimum wage and 
tax reform went nowhere during the period of unified government.  
This was true even though these issues captured majority support in 
opinion polls, particularly from low- and middle-income voters.240  Of 
course, the absence of such legislation can be explained in part by a 
lack of time and resources; the government prioritized healthcare 
and financial reform and had little bandwidth for more.  But that ex-
planation circles back to the role of organized wealth:  Part of why 
healthcare and financial reform occupied so much time was because 
of the political economy sketched above. 
Systematic constraints and the shaping of debate by organized 
business interests are not a new phenomenon.  Like the Obama Ad-
ministration, recent prior Democratic administrations have rarely en-
acted legislation opposed staunchly by wealth, even during periods of 
unified government—and even after making campaign promises to 
prioritize such reforms.241  A look at the history of labor law reform 
 
238 See 2008 Democratic Party Platform, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78283 (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
239 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 279.  On the Obama legislative agenda and the role 
of lobbyists, see id. at 278–85. 
240 See BARTELS, supra note 192, at 230 (noting that in thirty-three different national surveys 
conducted between 1985 and 2006, support for increasing the minimum wage averaged 
80%); Frank Newport, Many Americans OK with Increasing Taxes on Rich, GALLUP (Apr. 25, 
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/106813/many-americans-increasing-taxes-rich.aspx 
(noting that over half of Americans believed the government should redistribute wealth 
through heavy taxes on the rich); Lydia Saad, In U.S., 71% Back Raising Minimum Wage, 
GALLUP (Mar. 6, 2013) http://www.gallup.com/poll/160913/back-raising-minimum-
wage.aspx (describing majority support for minimum wage over time). 
241 See GILENS, supra note 191, at 178–79, 193–96, 199–200 (showing that the unified Clinton 
years were more responsive to high-income preferences than to those of lower- and mid-
dle-income Americans); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 127–32, 278–79 (discuss-
ing such legislative failures during the Carter and Obama administrations). 
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illustrates the point.  The statute governing collective organization of 
workers—the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)—was enacted 
in 1935 and substantially amended in 1947 with the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act.  Altered in minor ways with the Landrum-Griffin Act 
of 1959, the text of the statute has otherwise remained unchanged.242  
On several occasions over the last thirty years, Democratic administra-
tions, governing with Democratic Congresses, have offered major leg-
islation to amend the NLRA. 
The motivation for the continued attempts at law reform by Dem-
ocrats is clear:  While globalization and other exogenous factors help 
explain the decline of unions in this country, the governing legal re-
gime is also an important cause of their weakness.  Put bluntly, the 
NLRA, in its current form, fails to protect workers’ ability to organize 
and bargain collectively with their employers.243  The law not only 
permits employers to express their opposition to unionization, it also 
recognizes their right to compel employees to listen to them in “cap-
tive audience” meetings and at the same time to exclude union rep-
resentatives from the workplace, and it enables employers to use de-
lay tactics aimed at suppressing organization.  So, too, existing law 
fails to effectively prevent or punish coercive and illegal forms of em-
ployer opposition.  The incidence of employer law-breaking has risen 
significantly since the 1970s.244 
More fundamentally, the Act is mismatched with the structure of 
the contemporary economy.245  The statutory regime excludes from its 
coverage independent contractors, temporary workers, “knowledge” 
workers, and, to some extent, undocumented immigrant workers—
precisely those workers that increasingly comprise the labor market.246  
It effectively permits employers to exclude themselves from the defi-
nition of employer and the responsibility of bargaining by contract-
 
242 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1532–
33 (2002). 
243 To some extent, the failure of the governing statute to protect workers can be traced to 
early Supreme Court decisions that “deradicalized” the original Wagner Act and that re-
introduced into the labor law many of the common law doctrines that the Act was meant 
to repudiate.  See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of 
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265–70 (1978).  See also 
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 9–10 (1983) (dis-
cussing early Supreme Court cases).  Congress ultimately entrenched many of these deci-
sions with the Taft-Hartley Act. 
244 Estlund, supra note 242, at 1536–37. 
245 See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:  EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 119–21 (2004) (discussing how modern employment 
law’s 1930s roots make it ill-suited for a digital workplace). 
246 See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (defining “employer” and “employee”). 
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ing out their supply chains.247  And because American labor law has 
been centered in a single preemptive federal statute, with exclusive 
enforcement powers vested in a single federal agency, labor law has 
been insulated from other avenues of rejuvenation and reform, mak-
ing federal statutory reform all the more necessary.248 
Yet, despite the close alliance between the Democratic Party and 
the labor movement, Democratic controlled Congresses, under 
Democratic Presidents, have been responsible for three major legisla-
tive defeats for the labor movement since the 1970s—the period dur-
ing which labor’s organizational strength began to decline.249  In 
1977, unions made a major labor law reform bill their top political 
priority.  Large Democratic majorities in the House and Senate and a 
Democratic president initially committed support.250  But business in-
terests energetically countermobilized and, although reform passed 
the House and commanded majority support in the Senate, the bill’s 
opponents were able to sustain a filibuster by picking off a substantial 
number of Democrats.251  Labor law reform during the Clinton Ad-
ministration met a similar fate, as business again mobilized against a 
further weakened labor movement.  Pushing for a new social bargain, 
the Clinton Administration, through the vehicle of a high-profile 
commission, sought a reform package that would have eased re-
strictions on so-called company unions, while making it easier for 
workers to organize.252  But the deal collapsed even before the Repub-
licans captured control of Congress in 1994, with the business com-
munity unwilling to countenance the renewed growth of trade union-
ism even in exchange for concessions that would have produced 
more flexibility for businesses.253  Again, in 2008, President Obama 
promised to reform labor law with the Employee Free Choice Act, 
 
247 But cf. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 186 (2015) (expanding 
the definition of “joint employer”). 
248 See generally James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996); Estlund, supra note 242, at 1527; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to 
Keep:  Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 
(1983). 
249 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 127–32 (discussing the political battles between 
the Carter Administration and business interest groups during the 1970s). 
250 See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES:  THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN 
AMERICA 148–50, 153 (1989) (analyzing the dynamic between organized labor and the 
Democratic Party after the 1976 election). 
251 Id. at 150–51, 156 (discussing the circumstances that enabled a filibuster to oppose the 
bill). 
252 See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION:  A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 245 
(2002) (explaining the Clinton Administration’s effort to revise labor law in order to ease 
the process of organizing labor unions). 
253 Id. 
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which would have made it significantly easier for workers to unionize 
and would have required arbitration for first contracts.  But after the 
Chamber and other wealthy and business interests targeted red state 
democrats, the bill died in a heavily Democratic Congress.254 
In short, Congress has not enacted broad, redistributive labor law 
reforms even under unified governments that purport to support 
such reform.  A similar story could be told about tax law255 and bank-
ing law,256 and little progress has been made on environmental law, 
given business opposition, even during unified Democratic govern-
ment.257  This pattern does not show that the parties are equivalent, 
but it does demonstrate the need to revise constitutional theory’s de-
piction of unified government.  Wealth substantially constrains the 
actions that even a unified government can take. 
B.  Divided Government and Gridlock 
Along with the growth in executive power, constitutional theorists 
worry about the decline of legislative power and the rise of gridlock.  
Congress today, many contend, is far more paralyzed than the Fram-
ers intended.  The reason, theorists explain, is that “when combined 
with today’s highly polarized political parties, veto points that once 
promoted bargaining and compromise now produce intransigence 
and gridlock.”258  Again, a bipartisan and trans-substantive account 
undergirds the story:  Gridlock is near universal and the parties are to 
blame.259  In practice, however, gridlock is not a substantively neutral 
or consistently occurring phenomenon.  Although partisanship is 
clearly part of the problem, it is an insufficient explanation for the 
most worrisome forms of gridlock. 
 
254 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 278–79. 
255 See generally Edward McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 21 (2012) (arguing that it is in Congress’s interest financially to periodically re-
view, yet do nothing, about tax reform). 
256 See generally MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 187. 
257 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 179, at 279–80 (discussing the fate of climate change 
legislation in the early Obama Administration). 
258 Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco:  Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (2014).  See also Mark Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats:  Preliminary 
Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 
643–44 (2014) (arguing that the contemporary construction of political parties and the 
constitutional order leads to excessive blockage and dysfunction). 
259 E.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 1–17 (discussing the current state of gridlock 
frustrating the administrative process in modern government); Levinson & Pildes, supra 
note 9, at 2341 (explaining that divided governments are more prone to gridlock); 
Pozen, supra note 1, at 9 (identifying that the current political sphere is characterized by 
gridlock and disfunction). 
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That is, not all gridlock is equivalent from a constitutional gov-
ernance perspective.  Political inaction due to true and insurmounta-
ble policy disagreements between large pluralities may actually reflect 
popular will; political action due to equally powerful opposing forces 
that represent different sectors of the citizenry may follow the 
Madisonian schema of ambition counteracting ambition.  Many ex-
amples of partisan gridlock are just that.260 
But political inaction can also result when power is concentrated 
in few hands, without countervailing inputs.  Wealth is an important 
source of this latter sort of gridlock.  There are several reasons why.  
First, given our contemporary political economy, wealthy individuals 
and business organizations have the greatest capacity to create grid-
lock even when majorities support reform.261  Using the range of 
mechanisms detailed in Part II—from campaign donations to lobby-
ing to aggressive engagement in the regulatory process—wealth has 
the resources to find and exploit veto points.  And, as previously 
demonstrated, given contemporary American organizational life, 
countervailing forces are often lacking.262 
Second, wealth also frequently has the greatest incentive to create 
gridlock because it has won at an earlier iteration of the process.  
That is, the status quo reflects the distribution of power in previous 
rounds of the policy process.263  Because the status quo reflects the 
outcome of prior power dynamics, often with “much greater benefits 
going to the privileged and the wealthy than to the needy and the 
poor,” changes to the equilibrium tend to reflect changes to the mo-
bilization of wealth.264  And research suggests that the greatest success 
of paid lobbyists occurs when they seek to protect the status quo from 
a proposed change.265 
 
260 Josh Chafetz, for example, takes issue with the normative aspects of the separation-of-
parties theory—the sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, assertion that partisanship’s 
effect on governance is something to be concerned about.  As he points out, “it would 
seem to be a democratic feature of the system, not a bug, that the institutional checks on 
that party’s ability to enact its agenda are weaker.”  Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of 
Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2076–77 n.66 (2013) (arguing that unified versus 
divided government should be understood as “dependent . . . on the will of the people, as 
expressed through electoral mechanisms”).  Accord Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism 
and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1124 n.242 (2011) (explaining that a uni-
fied government may more effectively express the will of the people). 
261 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra note 88–90 and accompanying text. 
263 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 203, at 19–20, 22–23, 240. 
264 Id. at 23. 
265 Id. at 147, 236. 
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Finally, the wealthy also have the most power over the changing 
market conditions in which law intervenes.  That is, legal stasis does 
not preclude wealthy interests, particularly large business organiza-
tions, from obtaining actual change through private ordering.  When 
government fails to amend formal rules in the face of changed social 
and economic conditions, the result is distinct from preservation of 
the status quo.  Political scientists Jacob Hacker, Paul Pierson, and 
Kathleen Thelan term this kind of gridlock “drift.”266  It occurs when 
the circumstances around policies or institutions change in ways that 
alter the effects of those policies or institutions on the ground, such 
that they no longer serve their intended purposes. 267  Yet, alternative 
rules would reduce the degree to which these shifts in outcomes oc-
cur.268  In other words, the shifts are potentially remediable, but ef-
forts to update the rules fail.  Business interests typically cause and 
benefit most from this form of gridlock.269 
Federal wage law illustrates the point.  Congress has failed to in-
crease the minimum wage since 2007.  At first glance, this looks like 
policy stasis.  But because the cost of living has increased steadily, in 
real terms, minimum wages have declined.  Policy has changed 
through drift.  Moreover, the failure to amend federal minimum 
wage law has occurred not because of a deeply divided population 
represented adequately by warring political parties or branches.  
Opinion polls regularly reflect widespread support for minimum 
wage increases.270  Rather, gridlock in this context has occurred be-
cause certain segments of organized business and other wealthy 
stakeholders have been able to influence key veto points in Congress 
and in the political parties.  Through the mechanisms discussed in 
Part II, wealth has influenced enough members of both parties and 
 
266 Jacob S. Hacker et al., Drift and Conversion:  Hidden Faces of Institutional Change, in 
ADVANCES IN COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 180 (James Mahoney & Kathleen 
Thelen eds., 2015). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 190–91. 
269 Hacker & Pierson, supra note 90, at 191 (describing “a clear and important example of 
drift—where organized political action effectively prevents the updating of policy in re-
sponse to changing market outcomes that were advantageous to the wealthy and power-
ful”). 
270 Press Release, Pew Research Center, Most See Inequality Growing, but Partisans Differ over 
Solutions 3 (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/1-23-14%
20Poverty_Inequality%20Release.pdf (citing a national survey which reported that “73% 
of the public favors raising the federal minimum wage from its current level of $7.25 an 
hour to $10.10 an hour”); Andrew Dugan, Most Americans for Raising Minimum Wage, 
GALLUP (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165794/americans-raising-
minimum-wage.aspx (reporting that “more than three-quarters of Americans (76%) say 
they would vote for raising the minimum wage to $9 per hour”). 
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both political branches to stop policy change.  Moreover, wealthy in-
terests have not only helped bring about federal paralysis on the min-
imum wage, but business interests have also benefited most from pol-
icy stasis.  There are structural reasons why this is so:  Because 
employers wield greater market power over employment conditions 
than do low-wage workers, they need not obtain legislative reforms to 
achieve policy goals; they can impose them through private ordering. 
The NLRA provides another example:  As described above, more 
than fifty years have passed without any significant statutory change 
in the NLRA.271  At first glance, this looks like a story of balanced par-
tisan gridlock, i.e., of warring interest groups aligned with warring po-
litical parties, neither with sufficient power to enact change.  On that 
view, this is a separation of powers success:  Ambition has been made 
to counteract ambition.  In fact, however, the story is more compli-
cated.  Business interests have been able to achieve change without 
statutory reform.  Through tactics such as outsourcing, subcontract-
ing, and globalizing, they have altered on-the-ground conditions of 
employment structures.  Of course, businesses may have multiple mo-
tivations for such restructuring; nonetheless, one effect is to render 
the labor law largely impotent.272  Cynthia Estlund recounts, 
The proof is in the political process:  While organized labor has mounted 
several major efforts at labor law reform in the past thirty years, employ-
ers—equipped though they are with all of the political advantages of or-
ganization, internal unity, access, and wealth—have made almost no such 
efforts since 1959.  For the most part, employers who oppose unions and 
collective bargaining are willing to bide their time in the political pro-
cess, batting down periodic reform proposals that might tip the scales in 
unions’ favor, and watching union strength ebb away.273 
Similar stories could be told about a host of other policy areas.  
Consider environmental law.  The Toxic Substances Control Act 
(“TSCA”) was passed in 1976 in order “to regulate chemical sub-
stances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment.”274  Yet after years of rapid technological 
advancement, the Act, according to the EPA, is now outdated and 
 
271 See Estlund, supra note 242, at 1535 (“The text of the NLRA has remained virtually un-
touched since 1959.”); see also supra notes 242–54 and accompanying text. 
272 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE:  WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 17–18 (2014) (explaining that fissured workplaces 
enable companies to circumvent labor laws); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employ-
ment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1535 (1996) (explaining that subcontracting allows 
for businesses to circumvent traditional employment laws). 
273 Estlund, supra note 242, at 1543–44. 
274 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1976). 
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fails to regulate many potentially dangerous substances.275  When ef-
forts at modernization stalled in 2012, business groups rejoiced; one 
industry-oriented blogger wrote, “gridlock promises to be the best so-
lution to a heated debate concerning legislation to reform the federal 
law dealing with chemicals.”276 
In short, legal theorists and popular commentators are clearly 
correct in identifying partisanship as an important cause of gridlock.  
But in focusing on partisanship alone, they miss key ways in which 
gridlock varies by issue and in effect.  Given the contemporary politi-
cal economy, gridlock is not merely a problem of the parties.  Rather, 
wealth has both unmatched capacity and incentive to bring about 
gridlock. 
C.  Administrative Checks 
Of course, divided government brings not only gridlock but also 
presidents and agencies with incentives to push the bounds of formal 
power.  Faced with intransigent legislatures from the opposing party, 
hyper-partisan presidents have found new tools to set policy unilater-
ally, without congressional approval.277  Presidents use direct meth-
ods, such as executive orders, presidential memoranda, and signing 
statements.  They also act indirectly, pressing executive branch agen-
cies to advance the Administration’s policy agendas through rulemak-
ing, waivers, guidance policy, enforcement efforts and so on.278  At the 
same time, internal separation-of-powers scholars emphasize, a host 
of non-partisan bureaucratic checks constrain such executive ac-
tion.279  Thus, according to the dominant narrative, across domains, 
 
275 Elizabeth Grossman, What the EPA’s “Chemicals of Concern” Plans Really Mean, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/epa-chemicals-of-
concern-plans/ (reporting that, in late 2009, EPA spokesperson Ernesta Jones expressed 
the “EPA’s strong belief that the 1976 law is both outdated and in need of reform”). 
276 Angela Logomasini, When Gridlock Is Good:  The Case Of The Toxic Substances Control Act, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Dec. 6, 2012), https://cei.org/blog/when-gridlock-
good-case-toxic-substances-control-act. 
277 See HOWELL, supra note 223, at 179 (studying the rise of various means of direct presiden-
tial action and explaining that, “[w]hile it was relatively rare, and for the most part incon-
sequential, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unilateral policy making has 
become an integral feature of the modern presidency.”).  See also Kagan, supra note 53, at 
2281–2303 (chronicling use of unilateral power during Clinton presidency); Kate 
Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1069–71 (exploring ris-
ing use of enforcement as unilateral policy tool). 
278 HOWELL, supra note 223, at 13–14 (identifying how presidents can advance their policy 
agendas through persuasion and indirect methods). 
279 See supra notes 10–11. 
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the President’s use of unilateral power is at once extensive and 
checked from within. 
While the above story is, in broad strokes, unassailable, it is also 
incomplete.  Again, the problem is that the account is undifferentiat-
ed:  it implies that the use of unilateral power is robust and hyper-
partisan, no matter what the issue, and that the internal bureaucracy 
serves as a neutral, effective check irrespective of substantive content.  
It largely fails to consider circumstances where this is not the case.  
Yet, as with gridlock, unilateral executive power and internal bureau-
cratic checks are shaped fundamentally by wealth.  Because of their 
systematic influence, economic elites, large businesses, and their or-
ganizations define both unilateral presidential action and internal 
checks on many issues. 
Consider executive orders.  The partisanship model teaches that, 
in this highly ideologically polarized environment, presidents use ex-
ecutive orders to pursue hyper-partisan agendas.  The implication of 
this theory is that, when government divided in 2010, the Democratic 
President should have issued executive orders to advance liberal poli-
cies not achievable in Congress.  Indeed, on a host of salient issues 
President Obama moved forward quickly with aggressive executive ac-
tions.  The most striking examples were the decision not to defend 
the Defense of Marriage Act and to use enforcement discretion to 
benefit immigrant children through Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals.  These were aggressive and partisan uses of executive power 
that polarized the electorate.  But both policies were also highly sali-
ent and had little opposition from business interests or economic 
elites more generally.280 
In contrast, the President’s labor-related executive orders—
including those that aim to raise the minimum wage for executive 
branch contracts and impose penalties on contracting employers with 
labor and employment violations—were issued a full six years after 
partisan supporters called for such action.  These orders, like the 
others, had strong support from the party’s base.  And as a formal le-
 
280 Indeed, leading business executives and the Chamber of Commerce advocated immigra-
tion reform.  See Sheldon Adelson, Warren Buffett & Bill Gates, Op-Ed., Break the Immigra-
tion Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2014, at A25 (showing three business executives publicly 
advocating for an immigration reform bill); Ashley Parker, Business-Conservative Alliance 
Presses for Immigration Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, at A16 (reporting on a large group 
of business executives advocating to politicians for immigration reform in an event spon-
sored by the Chamber of Commerce).  More than 200 companies, including Citigroup, 
Apple, Mars and Alcoa, publicly urged the Supreme Court to overturn the Defense of 
Marriage Act.  Erik Eckholm, In Gay Marriage Brief, A Corporate Call for Change, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2013, at B1. 
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gal matter, they were no more aggressive than the gay rights and im-
migration orders.  The D.C. Circuit has interpreted liberally the Pres-
ident’s authority to implement the contracting law including through 
imposition of employment-related requirements.281 
Given the strong support for a minimum wage hike and basic em-
ployment rights among the Democratic base, the separation-of-parties 
theory would suggest that there should have been a quick issuance of 
pro-worker executive orders.  Yet the orders were strenuously op-
posed by the business community and they faced bipartisan inter- and 
intra-branch opposition.  That is, members of Congress and bureau-
cratic officials with long-term relationships with the contracting 
community repeatedly sought to squelch the orders.282  Ultimately, 
the labor executive orders were issued only after significant counter-
vailing forces mobilized:  federally contracted workers repeatedly 
went on strike calling attention to their poverty wages, as did workers 
in other low-wage industries, most notably fast food.283  Meanwhile, 
popular concern and commentary about economic inequality 
mounted. 
It should not be surprising that presidential unilateralism has 
been cautious on issues opposed by business interests.  Recall the 
many ways Presidents and their White Houses confront wealth.  But 
there is considerable tension between this account and the picture of 
an unbound and hyper-polarized president.  In short, an examination 
of presidential actions in light of political economy leads to a more 
 
281 See, e.g., UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (emphasizing “the necessary flexibility and ‘broad-ranging authority’” given to the 
President by the procurement Act); AFL-CIO v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (holding that the President’s executive action to place a parking charge on federal 
employee parking spaces falls within authority granted by Congress); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 
618 F.2d 784, 788, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (upholding the President’s executive ac-
tion to establish wage and price standards for executive agencies); Contractors Ass’n of 
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec. of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 162–63, 174 (3d Cir. 1971) (uphold-
ing an executive action that required construction companies to submit affirmative action 
plans). 
282 Steven Greenhouse, Plan to Seek Use of U.S. Contracts as a Wage Lever, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2010, at A1.  Cf. Josh Eidelson, Federal Workers to Strike, March on White House Wedneday, 
SALON (Sept. 24, 2013) http://www.salon.com/2013/09/24/federal_workers_to_strike_
march_on_white_house_wednesday/ (noting, in 2013, that a “high road” contracting pol-
icy that would have offered companies with higher standards a leg up in securing con-
tracts, was under consideration by the administration in 2010, but “never came to pass”). 
283 See, e.g., Elena Schneider, Food Services Workers Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, at A14 (re-
porting on strikes by hundreds of federally contracted food service workers); Steven 
Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Seeking $15 Wage Plan Civil Disobedience at Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2014, at B3 (reporting on nationwide strikes of fast-food workers calling for wages 
to increase to $15). 
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complicated picture of unilateralism than that depicted in the litera-
ture. 
When one considers agency action—and the mechanisms of in-
ternal separations of power—the impact of money becomes even 
more evident:  When government does act contrary to organized 
wealth, attention shifts to the less visible administrative process. 
Return to financial regulatory reform.  Despite the broad reach 
and several thousand pages of the Dodd-Frank Act, few of its provi-
sions took effect in the summer of 2010.  Instead, the details of the 
Act were left for the federal rulemaking process.284  That process has 
been overwhelmingly dominated by the financial services industry, 
with regulators meeting regularly with representatives from big banks 
and banking associations, and much less often with consumer and 
pro-reform groups.285  The amount of money spent by Wall Street on 
persuading regulators and members of Congress during this period 
also far dwarfed countervailing resources.286  Meanwhile, the banking 
industry provided campaign donations to both Republican and Dem-
ocratic members who had capacity to influence rulemakers.287 
Meetings and money, of course, do not prove influence.  But as 
the broader studies discussed in Part II indicate, organized wealth has 
 
284 Tarbert, supra note 227, at 373 (explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act left most of the 
rulemaking responsibility to administrative agencies in the years subsequent to the Act’s 
passage). 
285 During the year following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, regulators at the three ma-
jor banking regulatory agencies—the Treasury, the Fed, and the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”)—reported meeting with twenty big banks and banking 
associations on average a combined 12.5 times per week.  That compares to just 2.3 meet-
ings with reform-oriented groups on average per week.  The top twenty banks appear 
1,298 times in meeting logs at the three agencies, while groups favoring tighter regula-
tions of the financial markets show up just 242 times.  Lee Drutman, Big Banks Dominate 
Dodd-Frank meetings with regulators, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (July 19, 2012, 4:00 AM) 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/07/19/dodd-frank-two-years-later/.  The gap 
widened following the first year.  With regulators increasingly focused on more technical 
rules (e.g., swap exchange facilities, position limits, proprietary trading), regulators met 
560 times with the big banks in 2012, but just eighty-one times with reform groups.  And 
during the first year of rulemaking, regulators met 738 times with the big banks as com-
pared to 161 meetings with the reform groups.  Id.  See also Nancy Watzman, Ex Post Facto 
Lobbying:  Banks Blitz Regulators to Soften Dodd-Frank’s Impact, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG 
(Jul. 22, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/07/22/cross-
border-lobbying/ (highlighting the number of financial industries met with compared to 
reform-oriented groups in the weeks leading up to a Dodd-Frank Act reform deadline). 
286 See Ben Protess, Wall Street Continues to Spend Big on Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 
1, 2011, 2:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/wall-street-continues-to-
spend-big-on-lobbying/ (reporting the vast amount of wealth spent by financial lobbyists 
in the wake of Dodd-Frank). 
287 Lipton & Protess, supra note 234 (reporting on the heavy lobbying by financial institu-
tions directed at politicians in both major parties). 
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long been successful at moderating the implementation of statutes 
through a host of interrelated tactics.  And, indeed, the progress of 
financial regulatory reform to date suggests that the lobbying by, and 
contributions from, the financial industry have been at least partially 
effective.  At the two-year anniversary date, the deadlines for more 
than half of the required rulemakings had expired and regulators 
had finalized rules for only one-third of those rulemakings with statu-
tory dates, missing the deadlines for the rest.288  Sheila Bair, who was 
appointed to head the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by 
George W. Bush in 2006 and served in that role until 2011, placed the 
blame for regulatory inaction on the resistance to reform posed by an 
industry with hundreds of lobbyists and hundreds of millions of dol-
lars to spend:  “At the end of the day, the regulators are out-
gunned.”289  One striking example of the strength of industry lobby-
ists is the evolution of the “de minimis exception” to the requirement 
that dealers selling derivatives register with the CFTC.  The original 
proposal was that when a dealer’s annual revenue from credit default 
swaps topped $100 million, it would  have to register and comply with 
a regulatory regime.  After the industry weighed in—at the behest of 
smaller but still wealthy and well-organized financial players—the ex-
emption was inflated dramatically:  the 2013 final rule set a threshold 
of $8 billion, which would shrink to $3 billion after three years.290 
While individual legislators sometimes oppose industry’s influence 
in the regulatory process, there is little reason to think that Congress 
consistently counteracts business’ influence.  Indeed, the existing da-
ta suggests Congress rarely intervenes on behalf of any diffuse public 
interest against industry interests.291  For example, during recent fi-
nancial regulatory hearings, “most of the Democrats on the commit-
tee, along with 31 Republicans, came to the industry’s defense, in-
cluding the seven freshmen Democrats—most of whom have started 
to receive donations this year from political action committees of 
Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo and other financial institutions, records 
show.”292  The literature also provides little to no support for the pos-
sibility that the President or the Office of Management and Budget 
 
288 Tarbert, supra note 227, at 373. 
289 Gary Rivlin, Wall Street Fires Back, THE NATION, May 20, 2013, at 11, 12, 14 (noting com-
mercial banks such as Wells Fargo, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, along with their 
trade groups, spent $55 million lobbying in 2010, the year Dodd-Frank became law, $61 
million in 2011 and another $61 million in 2012). 
290 Id. at 22; 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-2 (2013). 
291 See Wagner et al., supra note 211, at 137 n.128, 142 (examining congressional interven-
tion in context of EPA rulemakings). 
292 Lipton & Protess, supra note 234. 
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(“OMB”) regularly intervenes to make agency rules more protective 
of the public interest and less protective of business, particularly once 
the issue is no longer salient.  To the contrary, the available evidence 
suggests that White House and OMB review, in the aggregate, further 
favors industry.293 
And there are countless other areas of administration where the 
influence of concentrated wealth has systematically checked and 
prodded the internal bureaucracy, without effective checks or inputs 
from the countervailing organization or the vast majority of Ameri-
cans.294  Environmental regulation and trade policy are two other 
striking examples.295 
Certainly, unilateral executive action does not always favor busi-
ness interests.  As the above discussion demonstrates, the checks and 
prods imposed by wealthy individuals and organizations are weaker 
when issues are highly salient and countervailing organizations act in 
opposition.296  Furthermore, agencies do not typically neglect their 
missions altogether even when they are pushed by business interests 
or adjust course in response to those interests.297  But while the effect 
of wealth on internal administrative checks is neither simple nor lin-
ear, it is systematic. 
IV.  ORGANIZED WEALTH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
Thus far, the project of this Article has been largely descriptive 
and critical:  wealth systematically checks the branches and the par-
 
293 For example, recent studies of OMB identify a distinct anti-environmental bent that is 
consistent across administrations.  See Wagner, supra note 211, at 151 n.166 (summarizing 
OMB studies from the Bush I and Clinton Administrations that analyzed the impact of 
regulation on industry). 
294 For another example involving the financial sector, see Tara Siegel Bernard, Brokers Fight 
Rule to Favor Best Interests of Customers, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2014, at B1, B7 (“Amid fierce 
pushback from the financial services industry, the Labor Department, which oversees re-
tirement plans, recently delayed releasing a revised proposal that would require a broader 
group of professionals to put their clients’ interest ahead of their own when dealing with 
retirement accounts.”). 
295 See, e.g., Robert E. Baldwin & Christopher S. Magee, Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional 
Voting on Recent Trade Bills (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6376, 
1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6376.pdf (finding that business influence affected 
legislators’ votes on NAFTA and GATT); Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki, Analyz-
ing the Role of Business in Environmental Policy, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:  
CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 3–4 (Michael E. Kraft & Shel-
don Kamieniecki eds., 2007). 
296 See supra notes 142, 158–59, 280–82 and accompanying text. 
297 See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 166, at 12 (arguing that even when regulatory capture 
exists, it is limited). 
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ties in ways that complicate a partisanship focused account.  This Part 
shifts to a normative analysis.  It asks how the dominance of wealth 
advances or impedes attainment of the functional goals of the separa-
tion of powers—as understood by contemporary scholars—and con-
cludes that democratic accountability is severely injured.  It then con-
siders what should be done in response. 
A.  Functions of Constitutional Structure 
Legal scholars and judges—at least those who embrace a func-
tional, rather than formal, approach to the separation of powers—
focus on several overarching goals of our separation of powers.  The-
se include preserving liberty, promoting governmental efficacy, and 
enhancing democratic accountability, all through diffusing political 
power.298  Scholars focusing on partisanship and internal checks em-
brace these goals as well.299  Given the limitations of inter-branch po-
litical competition in practice, they argue, political parties and inter-
nal executive branch checks provide an alternate way to achieve or 
undermine these functional goals.300  But how does wealth shape the 
ability of the branches, parties, and internal checks to achieve these 
goals? 
1.  Liberty 
In the conventional telling, liberty is a central aim of the separa-
tion of powers.  By dividing functions among the three branches and 
enabling the various branches to check one another, the theory runs, 
the Framers sought to reduce “the amount of damage to liberty or 
other interests that any fallible or corrupt official might be able to in-
flict.”301  According to some commentators, hyper-polarization and 
 
298 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000) 
(describing goals as protecting fundamental rights, advancing democracy, and enhancing 
professional competence); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 
1725, 1729–30 (1996) (describing separation of powers goals as balance, accountability, 
and energetic, efficient government); Magill, supra note 131, at 1148–52, 1148 n.80 
(2000) (arguing that formalists and functionalists agree on an intermediate goal of sepa-
ration of powers:  to prevent a single branch of government from possessing and using 
too much power).  Historical accounts of the founding are largely in accord.  See, e.g., 
GWYN, supra note 73, at 127–28. 
299 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 10, at 428 (describing the ultimate goal of separation of pow-
ers as dispersing federal power across three branches to prohibit tyranny while creating 
an effective and accountable National government). 
300 See supra notes 9–11; see also infra notes 304, 308, 314–15 and accompanying text. 
301 Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?  54 B.C.L. REV. 433, 440 
(2013).  The notion is that, because branches independent of Congress would ultimately 
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the related growth of the executive branch at the expense of Con-
gress threatens this promise.302  On this account, the over-empowered 
Executive directs vast domestic and national security programs, and is 
virtually unchecked even when government actions threaten individ-
ual liberty interests. 
For such critics of executive power, the political economy 
sketched above could assuage concerns, at least insofar as the particu-
lar executive actions in question implicate market and business inter-
ests.  As discussed in Part III.A, even during periods of unified gov-
ernment when the partisanship theory predicts legislative and 
executive collusion, wealth, particularly business organizations, func-
tions to moderate and limit government action.  Indeed, when there 
are opposing interests within the business community, as is often the 
case, potential government intrusions on liberty interests decrease 
further; it becomes difficult for any one particular interest group 
within the category of wealthy interests to propel government action 
past multiple veto gates.  And in times of divided government, when 
the executive may attempt to push the boundaries of formal power, 
wealth often has sufficient influence throughout the bureaucracy and 
the White House to provide a check where one otherwise may be 
lacking.303 
Yet in other important ways, money in governance operates at 
cross-purposes with liberty goals:  Wealth can overwhelm internal ex-
ecutive branch mechanisms designed to protect individual fairness 
and due process.  For example, within agencies, the separation of ad-
judication from legislative, investigatory, and enforcement activities 
aims to promote due process, while the civil service is designed to de-
politicize governmental administration in order to ensure regularity 
and the rule of law.304  Wealth’s systematic influence over these inter-
nal mechanisms weakens their ability to deliver on that promise.305 
Perhaps more importantly, the notion that minimizing government 
action necessarily promotes liberty, particularly in the economic 
 
apply the law, legislators would have strong incentives to define punishable misconduct 
with precision and moderation, thereby benefiting all citizens, whether friends of Con-
gress or not.  AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 63 (2005).  See also 
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1515–16, 
1530–31 (1991) (arguing that the primary separation of powers goal is to protect individ-
ual rights against encroachment by a tyrannical majority). 
302 E.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 15–16; SHANE, supra note 221, at vii.  Cf. Levinson & 
Pildes, supra note 9, at 2350, 2354–55. 
303 See supra Part III.C. 
304 Metzger, supra note 10, at 429–30. 
305 See supra Part III.C. 
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sphere, rests on a Lochnerian vision of individual freedom.306  Should 
one reject that view, recognizing that government inaction often al-
lows for private invasions of liberty interests or, more fundamentally, 
that market ordering is itself a legal construct, the argument for or-
ganized wealth’s political checks would further weaken. 
2.  Efficacy 
While the separation of powers is often thought of as a way to 
check government action, the division of governmental functions can 
also serve to promote effective government.  Indeed, scholars have 
argued that our constitutional structure is aimed not only at checking 
government action, but also at establishing productive and energetic 
government, a break from the national experience under the Articles 
of Confederation.307  The idea is that by engendering competition 
among and between the branches, government actors can be stirred 
to act.308  And by enabling each branch to concentrate on a different 
function, expertise can flourish.309  Our constitutional structure thus 
seeks to facilitate necessary action and to increase the efficacy of gov-
ernment.310 
A common refrain in the literature and commentary on constitu-
tional dysfunction is that hyper-polarization has impeded governmen-
tal energy and efficacy.  Because of partisan divides, the branches do 
not stir one another to act, but rather remain locked in opposition.311  
According to more recent work, the problem is not just polarization 
but fragmentation.  Because contemporary parties are fragmented 
and decentralized, the parties’ formal leaders, who should have the 
most incentive to compromise, struggle to control other members.312 
To these critics of contemporary political partisanship, there is a 
positive story to tell about the effects of wealth on Congress.  
 
306 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  For one such critique of Lochner and its re-
liance on common law baselines, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 873, 875 (1987). 
307 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (noting that by “allocating specific 
powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task,” the Framers created a national 
government that is “effective”).  AMAR, supra note 301, at 64; ARENDT, supra note 36, at 
152–55 (discussing Montesquieu and Founders’ incorporation of his theories). 
308 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2312; Waldron, supra note 301, at 440. 
309 AMAR, supra note 301, at 64. 
310 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 24, at 366–67 (emphasizing the capacity of divided authori-
ties to push each other to action when changing social conditions require it). 
311 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 2, at 330–31. 
312 See Pildes, supra note 2, at 333 (explaining that the extreme polarization of political par-
ties has damaging, and seemingly irreversible consequences). 
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Through the mechanisms discussed in Parts I and II, wealth mitigates 
polarization on important issues.  Wealth exerts substantial influence 
over both parties, ensuring that key segments of each support their 
positions.  Thus, in practice, compromises are often more likely to be 
reached when government action is essential for business interests. 
Whether this phenomenon is something to celebrate, however, is 
contestable.  The answer depends in large part on one’s policy per-
spective and estimation of the compromises reached. Moreover, gov-
ernment action produced by wealth’s influence over both parties may 
be in tension with the third functional goal of separation of powers:  
democratic accountability.  That is, such action may not be reflective 
of majority viewpoints, and may sometimes be more aptly described 
as capture than compromise.313 
Finally, and most important, just as wealth can help narrow the 
gap between the political parties in order to promote governmental 
action, wealth also prevents action where legislators across partisan 
divides might otherwise agree.  As Part III.B discussed, business inter-
ests often have particular ability to affect gridlock:  Campaign dona-
tions, lobbying, personal connections, the revolving door, expertise 
over technical issues, and other mechanisms enable wealth to exer-
cise influence over various veto points in the legislative process, and 
thereby to block incipient action.  And business interests have partic-
ular incentive to affect gridlock:  They are able to exercise significant 
control over the market conditions in which law attempts to inter-
vene, making legislative change less appealing. 
Within the executive branch, a similarly mixed picture of the rela-
tionship between wealth and governmental efficacy emerges.  Schol-
ars who study the administrative state often emphasize its ability to 
produce energetic and effective government:  In an era of polariza-
tion and gridlock, when the inter-branch system fails, executive 
branch agencies continue to innovate and govern.314  According to 
these scholars, internal separations and checks encourage inter-
agency competition and the development of expertise, both of which 
enhance governmental productivity.315 
 
313 See supra Part III.C (discussing role of organized wealth in regulatory and administrative 
process). 
314 See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 48, at 260; Freeman & Spence, supra note 48, at 7; Kagan, 
supra note 53, at 2344. 
315 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1150–51 (2012) (discussing benefits and drawbacks of inter-agency 
coordination); Metzger, supra note 10, at 425 (analyzing what types of administrative 
structures are likely to prove effective at checking executive power). 
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Checks and prods by wealthy interests sometimes enhance this 
dynamic.  Business groups can be instrumental in pushing agencies 
to innovate.  They also can provide important information through-
out the regulatory process, enhancing expertise. On the other hand, 
organized wealth is just as likely, if not more so, to stall regulation.316  
Indeed, even when one part of an agency innovates through new 
regulatory or enforcement tools, business groups often find ways to 
check the putative policies before they are enacted or to challenge 
them once implemented.317 
3.  Democratic Accountability 
The third function attributed to our constitutional structure by 
both the Court and contemporary theorists is that of furthering dem-
ocratic accountability.318  According to numerous scholars, the 
Founders sought to create a government influenced by, and in service 
of, the citizenry generally—as opposed to a regime by and for “the 
cabals of a few.”319  Separating powers across branches was one way to 
achieve this goal.  By establishing multiple centers of recourse, many 
places to which citizens can appeal when they are not receiving satis-
faction from other centers of government, government becomes 
more responsive and accountable, while still respecting liberty inter-
ests.320  Because each government entity is selected in a different way 
by a different constituency, government policy, the theory runs, is 
more likely to reflect multiple indices of popular sentiment.321  And 
while a faction might be able to capture one branch, it is less likely to 
acquire power over all three.322 
Scholars who focus on alternate mechanisms of political competi-
tion emphasize democratic accountability as well.  For example, in-
ternal separation-of-powers scholars contend that the separation of 
functions within agencies and the presence of multiple loci of appeal 
 
316 See supra Part III.B & notes 284–95 and accompanying text. 
317 See notes 284–95, 345–47 and accompanying text. 
318 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (emphasizing accountability, along 
with efficacy, as a separation-of-powers goal).  For descriptions of accountability as a core 
separation of powers value, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Uni-
tary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42–45 (1995) and Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 220, at 
94. 
319 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 60, at 82. 
320 See AMAR, supra note 301, at 64 (discussing how separation of powers has allowed each 
branch to become specialized). 
321 Id. 
322 Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 434–36 (1987). 
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within the administrative state help preserve the accountability of the 
bureaucracy, while making capture more difficult.323 
It is not inconceivable that the political economy described above 
could be construed as consistent with a vision of democratically ac-
countable government.  Indeed, the current majority of the Court 
has so argued.  According to Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for 
the majority in McCutcheon v. FEC, removing limits on campaign con-
tributions allows those persons (natural or otherwise) who care the 
most about issues to organize effectively and make their views 
heard.324  On this view, systematic checks and prods by wealthy indi-
viduals and business organizations help conform government action 
to the views of those who care enough to get involved. 
On the other hand—and I think this is the correct view—wealth’s 
disproportionate influence at every step of the political and govern-
ing process and the lack of effective countervailing participation 
mean that government leaders often fail to consider, and government 
action often fails to reflect, the views and interests of the vast majority 
of Americans.  Instead, government hears from and responds to the 
interests of a particular faction. As a result, the democratic accounta-
bility promised by inter-branch competition, as well as by alternative 
mechanisms of political competition, is missing.  And one need not 
settle on a single theory of democratic accountability to conclude that 
capture by faction is inconsistent with the ideal.325 
At the most fundamental level, our constitutional structure aims 
to preserve republican government and protect the citizens from the 
emergence of tyranny “by establishing multiple heads of authority in 
government, which are then pitted one against another in a continu-
ous struggle.”326  As James Madison wrote long ago, “It is of great im-
portance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the op-
pression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the 
injustice of the other part.”327  As the preceding section demonstrates, 
 
323 See Metzger, supra note 10, at 457 (concluding that maintaining executive branch ac-
countability through congressional enactments reinforces the importance of separation 
of powers in “the contemporary world of administrative governance”). 
324 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014).  But see id. at 1462 (“Representatives are not to follow con-
stituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns.  
Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected offi-
cials.”). 
325 For one theory of representation, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION 144–45 (1967) (highlighting that a delegate “must do what his principal 
would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting . . . must vote as a majority of his 
constituents would”). 
326 Strauss, supra note 13, at 578. 
327 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 60, at 323. 
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because of the pervasive influence of wealth across branches and par-
ties, power is far less diffused than constitutional theory promises.  
The multiple heads of authority in government and in politics do not 
consistently perform the checking and prodding function anticipat-
ed, or at least do not do so in ways reflective of and accountable to 
the citizenry generally. 
B.  Reforming Constitutional Law 
Wealth corrodes constitutional structure, leaving us with a gov-
ernment in which power is frequently not diffused and democratic 
responsiveness is undermined.  What should be done?  This section 
first considers the possibility of using greater judicial review of execu-
tive and legislative action to check the role of wealth.  It ultimately 
concludes, however, that institutional design reform—namely reform 
aimed at building countervailing organization, as well as more famil-
iar election law and lobbying reform—is more promising than an ex-
panded role for the judiciary.  Finally, it responds to critics who 
would argue that such reform is wholly impossible given the political 
economy described in this article. 
1.  Enhanced Judicial Review 
One possible response to the power of wealth in politics and gov-
ernance would be something akin to the tiered judicial scrutiny of 
executive action established by Justice Robert Jackson’s famous con-
currence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.328 Or, more famil-
iarly, the heightened scrutiny defended in United States v. Carolene 
Products’ famous footnote four.329  Courts could impose more intense 
judicial review of legislative or executive action in circumstances 
where wealth has dominated without countervailing checks.  For ex-
ample, courts might impose greater scrutiny when wealthy interests 
have participated at disproportionate rates in the administrative pro-
cess, or where a particular governmental action serves to further con-
centrate power among the wealthy.  Conversely, where the executive 
acts to remediate the concentration of wealth or where the govern-
ment effectively involves countervailing organizations in the govern-
ance process, more deference would be due. 
 
328 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 
2353–54 (arguing for more intense judicial review of executive action, particularly in the 
national security context, to redress the absence of partisan checks during unified gov-
ernment). 
329 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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Indeed, courts, for a time, sought to redress imbalances in interest 
group power in the context of administrative law cases. Beginning in 
the late 1960s, judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia made a concerted effort to consider the role of concentrated 
power in administrative law cases.330  In the view of these judges, the 
costs and dynamics of political organization meant that industry and 
other business interests were overrepresented.  As a result, environ-
mental, consumer, and other interests were due special solicitude.  
The judges thus fashioned new procedural rules that required agen-
cies to offer more procedures than the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) mandated.331  The D.C. Circuit essentially attempted a power 
diffusing project, in which the judicial role was heightened when 
countervailing checks were absent.332 
The Supreme Court unanimously put an end to this approach in 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.333  Holding that hybrid procedural requirements had no basis in 
the APA, the Court emphasized that in reviewing agency rules, judges 
should “not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the proce-
dural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which 
procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, undefined 
public good.”334 
Outside of the APA context, however, judicially imposed height-
ened scrutiny is not foreclosed, for Vermont Yankee was an interpreta-
tion of the APA, not a general rejection of the use of judicial pre-
 
330 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 829 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 988 (1977) (“[W]e are particularly concerned that the fi-
nal shaping of the rules we are reviewing here may have been by compromise among con-
tending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the independent discretion in the pub-
lic interest the Communications Act vests in individual commissioners.”); MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The ultimate test of in-
dustry structure in the communications common carrier field must be the public interest, 
not the private financial interests of those who have until now enjoyed the fruits of a de 
facto monopoly.”). 
331 For analysis of these developments, see Merrill, supra note 33, at 1050–52; Antonin Scalia, 
Vermont Yankee:  The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 
348--56 (1978); Stewart, supra note 151, at 1711–60; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 394 (2015)  
332 Bruce Ackerman has referred to this as a democracy-enhancing project.  See Bruce 
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). 
333 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
334 Id. at 549 (1978); see also id. at 524 (“[T]he [APA] established the maximum procedural 
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in 
conducting rulemaking procedures. . . .  [R]eviewing courts are generally not free to im-
pose [additional procedural requirements].”); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1983) (warning against overly stringent arbitrari-
ness of judicial review). 
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sumptions to counter-balance powerful interest groups.  Indeed, in 
the 1980s, drawing on public choice theory, numerous scholars urged 
variations of this approach, albeit not from a separation-of-powers 
perspective.335  For example, courts could apply less scrutiny to execu-
tive orders or regulations designed to redress economic inequality or 
to protect the environment.  The theory would be that those are the 
kinds of policies unable to pass Congress even in unified government 
due to the aggregation of power in the hands of wealthy individuals 
and business organizations.  Conversely, when an executive order 
benefits a narrow and well-funded interest, and there are no counter-
vailing checks, courts could follow Justice Jackson in tilting toward re-
jection of executive action, particularly when that action amounts to a 
novel expansion of executive power. 
Such an approach finds support in existing case law.  Following 
Vermont Yankee, lower courts have continued to worry about agency 
capture, and those concerns have influenced their decisionmaking.336  
 
335 Numerous scholars have used public choice theory to argue for heightened judicial re-
view in the constitutional context.  See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:  THE 
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2, 17–25, 31–39 (1966) (arguing that, at least in 
the First Amendment area, the Court should not defer to a political process driven by in-
terest group politics but rather should advance the cause of the groups the political pro-
cess underrepresents); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword:  The 
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46–47, 78, 80–81 (1989) (arguing that the 
susceptibility of the politically accountable branches to interest group pressure under-
mines the case for deferential constitutional review); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revital-
ization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705–17 (1984) (advocating far-
reaching substantive judicial review under the Takings and Contract Clauses to curb rent 
seeking); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation:  Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 
TUL. L. REV. 849, 875 (1980) (using interest group theory to support his argument that 
the Supreme Court should invalidate some “private-regarding” legislation); Sunstein, su-
pra note 32, at 52, 85–86 (supporting use of more rigorous constitutional scrutiny to in-
validate legislation that rewards the raw political power of interest groups).  Scholars have 
also argued that judges should employ the tools of statutory interpretation to render in-
terest group capture more difficult or less effective.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Poli-
tics Without Romance:  Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 275, 279, 298–99, 303–09, 324–25 (1988) (arguing for narrowly interpreting statutes 
when the benefits are concentrated and the costs distributed, and broadly interpreting 
statutes when the benefits are distributed and the costs are concentrated); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471, 486 (1989) 
(advocating narrowly construing statutes that represent interest group transfers).  For 
discussion of the literature, see Elhauge, supra note 151, at 32. 
336 See, e.g., Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing the risk of 
agency capture as a justification for holding that a state enforcement action against solid 
waste facility did not trigger statutory bar against a subsequent citizen suit); Am. Horse 
Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that an agency’s corre-
spondence with representatives of the regulated industry casts doubt on the agency’s in-
terpretation of available data and suggested that the agency’s refusal to act was not the 
product of reasoned decision-making); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 809 n. 
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For example, courts have observed, that, in light of the problem of 
agency capture and the outsized role of industry in rulemaking pro-
cess, “if there are policy reasons to exempt federal agencies 
from . . . suits, it is up to Congress to assess them and to determine 
whether the scope of its sovereign immunity waiver should be revisit-
ed.”337  Other courts have fashioned rules, not found in the text of the 
APA, to guard against ex parte contacts with powerful interest 
groups.338  Courts could do still more to impose heightened review in 
similar circumstances.339  To that end, legal scholars, in recent work, 
have sought to reinvigorate arguments for heightened judicial scruti-
ny of laws that discriminate on the basis of wealth or that reflect the 
political powerlessness of the poor.340 
 
36 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the “sham exception” to the rule that joint efforts to in-
fluence public officials do not violate antitrust laws is applicable in situations of agency 
capture); Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 911 F. Supp. 2d 739, 753–54 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012) (citing the risk of agency capture to support a public nuisance claim against a 
federal agency).  See also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:  1967–1983, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1997) (observing that “most of the innovations [expanding 
the authority of courts at the expense of agencies] spawned during the 1967–1983 period 
have endured”). 
337 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 754. Some scholars have called for a Ver-
mont Yankee II, urging the Supreme Court to rein in perceived undue lower-court inter-
ference with agency discretion and autonomy. See Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Repro-
cessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 860 (2007) (urging the Court to 
repudiate a host of court-made rules not found in the text of the APA, including the rule 
prohibiting agency ex parte contacts and prejudgment in rulemakings to the expanded 
modern conception of the notice of proposed rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting 
for Vermont Yankee II, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 669, 670 (2005) (calling for a Vermont Yankee II 
to end the First Circuit’s then presumption that language in organic statutes calling for a 
“hearing” in agency adjudications triggers the APA’s formal, trial-type adjudicatory pro-
cedures); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking:  Waiting for Vermont Yan-
kee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 418 (1981) (calling for a Vermont Yankee II to put an end to 
rigorous substantive judicial review of agency policy decisions).  To date, the Court has 
made only minor interventions.  Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 331, at 394. 
338 See e.g., Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 51–58.  In the years since Vermont Yankee, the D.C. 
Circuit has effectively limited the prohibition on ex parte contacts to informal rule-
makings that resolve conflicting claims among identifiable claimants rather than establish 
general policy.  See Iowa State Commerce Comm’n v. Office of the Fed. Inspector of the 
Alaska Natural Gas Transp. Sys., 730 F.2d 1566, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v. 
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing whether the court intended 
Home Box Office to apply to all informal rulemaking procedures). 
339 Cf. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Rational Basis With Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 1055 (2014) (arguing for “rational basis with bite” when licensing laws, 
brought about by interest group lobbying, restrict entry into a field of economic activity). 
340 See Ross & Li, supra note 7; see generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015) (defining political powerlessness and arguing that the poor 
are powerless at the federal and state levels). 
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2.  Problems with Heightened Judicial Review 
Greater judicial scrutiny is appealing for anyone concerned about 
wealth’s role in governance.  Yet, ultimately there are reasons to be 
wary of relying on the judiciary to reduce the checks and prods im-
posed by wealth.341  For one, while substantial evidence demonstrates 
the dominance of wealthy interests in governance overall, it is much 
harder to determine whether wealthy individuals and businesses have 
dominated in a single case.  Likewise, while there is little doubt that 
governmental policy overall has contributed to rising inequality, it is 
not always easy to determine if a particular regulation or statutory 
provision would further concentrate economic and political power. 
More importantly, courts may not be particularly effective at mak-
ing these determinations.  Under the adversarial system, courts gen-
erally consider only the arguments of the actual litigants.  Individuals 
or organizations interested in the future implications of a case, but 
not in the judgment itself, generally lack standing and receive inade-
quate consideration.342  Courts also are often not presented with the 
full array of arguments.  And because they focus on the particular 
parties and adjudicated historical facts before them, courts tend to 
underweigh, or be underinformed about, the systemic context and 
consequences of their decisions.343 
Furthermore, even if courts could determine whether the influ-
ence of concentrated wealth had resulted in an absence of political 
checks in a particular instance, or whether a particular policy was 
likely to further concentrate power with wealth, more intrusive judi-
cial review might not actually redress the problem.344  Litigation, like 
 
341 For an excellent elaboration of the problems associated with enhanced judicial review to 
combat interest group power, see Elhauge, supra note 151.  See also NEIL K. KOMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 98–150 (1994) (making the case for comparative institutional analysis between 
politics, the market, and courts, and explaining that the groups that are over-represented 
or under-represented in the political process may also be over-represented or under-
represented, as the case may be, in the courts and in the economic marketplace).  For a 
qualified response, see Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism 
After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 229–30 (1997) (arguing that judicial policymak-
ing may be less susceptible to interest group distortions—but only within a narrow range 
of controversies where each of the contending positions is represented by a group with 
significant (but not necessarily equal) organization strength, and only when the out-
comes reached in these circumstances will not be trumped by a legislated solution). 
342 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–67 (1992) (holding that the 
prediction of future harm is insufficient to obtain standing). 
343 Elhauge, supra note 151, at 77. 
344 Elhauge argues that “any defects in the political process identified by interest group theo-
ry depend on implicit normative baselines and thus do not stand independent of substan-
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legislation and regulation, is susceptible to wealthy interest group 
pressures.  Litigation is expensive.  Well-financed groups are able to 
litigate more frequently, to influence more effectively the infor-
mation tribunals receive, and to strategically settle cases that may 
produce unfavorable precedents.  These methods do not require that 
judges sympathize with any particular view.  Rather, they depend on 
parties’ differential abilities to litigate and settle.345 
Finally, there is also the separate concern that at least some por-
tion of judges might be predisposed to favor wealth.  Wealthy interest 
groups influence judicial appointments and are more likely to do so 
if judges serve as more general regulators.346  And judges, perhaps 
even more so than elected officials, are drawn from the elite.347  
Though Article III judges are not subject to the same capture and 
corruption mechanisms at work in the political branches, they too are 
likely to bring their own beliefs and experiences to bear on decisions 
they make.348  As with other proposals that would change judicial re-
view to make it less deferential to political outcomes, greater scrutiny 
of laws here would expand the lawmaking power of the judiciary. 
In short, increased judicial review could perversely augment the 
influence of wealth, further limiting checks on its power.  And in-
deed, business interests have had remarkable success, of late—in cas-
es involving labor rights, health and safety, and consumer protec-
tion—in convincing judges on the D.C. Circuit and elsewhere to 
protect wealth from national regulatory intrusion, even if it means 
developing new doctrine to do so.349 
 
tive conclusions about the merits of particular political outcomes.”  Id. at 34.  This is a val-
id point; however, this Article answers it by offering a baseline norm of a more equal dis-
tribution of political power on the axis of wealth. 
345 See id. at 80. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
346 Elhauge, supra note 151, at 80–81; Nancy Scherer, et al., Sounding the Fire Alarm:  The Role 
of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1026 (2008). 
347 CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST:  FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT 
ADMINISTRATION 60 (1995) (“Federal judges are already drawn from the ranks of educat-
ed political elites.”). 
348 See id.  See generally Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of 
Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693 (2014) (discussing the effects of a judge’s prior assump-
tions, values, and experiences on judicial decisionmaking).  Cf. MCCARTY ET AL., supra 
note 93, at 55, 76 (explaining the role biases play in interest group votes). 
349 See e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down SEC 
regulation mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, which was designed to require disclosure of the origin of “conflict minerals”); R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking 
down, under commercial speech doctrine, a rule requiring disclosure on cigarette pack-
ages); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking down NLRB 
rule that compelled employers to post a notice that recounts employee rights under exist-
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C.  Democratic Institutional Design and the Law of Organization 
1.  From Moderation and Insulation to Participation and Organization 
Though lawyers often look to courts to solve problems, judge-
made doctrine can only do so much to diffuse political power.  Given 
the limits of judicial intervention, institutional design may well be a 
more promising avenue for addressing the dominance of wealth in 
governance.  Existing reform proposals in the constitutional structure 
literature are, not surprisingly, inadequate to the task.  They typically 
focus on moderating the power of the partisan Executive and on in-
sulating the bureaucracy from partisanship.350  Such proposals would 
do little to diffuse power lodged with wealth.  Even if the President’s 
power were reduced, wealthy groups and individuals would continue 
to have unmatched resources to participate disproportionately in 
agency meetings and comments, to provide regulators access to vital 
information, and to appeal to different governmental actors regard-
ing the interpretation of law and regulation.  Indeed, it is telling that 
some independent agencies, structurally insulated from the full ex-
tent of presidential power, have suffered capture by organized busi-
ness interests no less than executive agencies.351  Similarly, proposals 
to amend legal rules and institutions to make political parties more 
ideologically “moderate,” or to strengthen the powers of the minority 
political party, may be helpful for other reasons, but would be unlike-
ly to diffuse the power of wealth.  Indeed, some such proposals are 
likely to create additional veto points for wealth to exploit.352 
 
ing law and invoking aggressive interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine, as well 
as agency’s statutory authority, to do so). 
350 See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2376–78 (“[C]onstiutional engineering might 
focus on insulating the administrative bureaucracy more fully from the partisan pressures 
of unified government.”); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation:  The Case of 
Executive Control Over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1826 (2010) (“[T]hough com-
plete insulation from political control may be unattainable . . . the structure of an inde-
pendent agency at least enables tensions between political actors to keep politically moti-
vated decisionmaking at bay.”). 
351 See Barkow, supra note 153, at 65–66 (using example of Consumer Products Safety Com-
mission to show how a structurally independent agency can be captured). 
352 For example, some scholars and elected officials have urged the use of open primaries to 
generate more moderate nominees and give voters more centrist choices on general elec-
tion day.  Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, 2380–81; Charles Schumer, End Partisan Prima-
ries, Save America, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2014, at A21.  But see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard 
H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 
(1998) (arguing that “artificial” barriers to robust partisan competition not be permit-
ted).  Another set of proposals is to empower the party out of control to offer criticisms 
and alternatives to the policies of the party in power and to engage in auditing, investiga-
tion, and information-gathering during times of unified government.  E.g., Fontana, supra 
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One obvious place to turn, then, is to proposals to reform cam-
paign finance law, to increase voting rights of less affluent Americans, 
often disenfranchised in practice if not by rule,353 and to increase 
transparency in politics and government.354  These proposals are im-
portant and, depending on their form, could help reduce the domi-
nance of both affluent individuals and business entities in politics.355 
At the same time, these proposals have commanded an undue 
amount of scholarly attention given their inherent limits.356  Reform 
efforts focused on restricting the flow of money—i.e., on insulating 
government actors from money’s influence—face significant, perhaps 
even insurmountable, practical hurdles:  Money finds new channels 
when regulators shut down one avenue.357  Without additional re-
 
note 49, at 602 (arguing that “government in opposition” rules are necessary to ensure 
that political minorities have a voice in the democratic process).  Scholars urging such re-
forms also view favorably the Senate filibuster, which empowers the minority in periods of 
unified government. 
353 Daniel Weeks, Why Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-
minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/. 
354 For example, the Sunlight Foundation urges reforms to make government more ac-
countable and transparent. See http://sunlightfoundation.com/. 
355 The separation-of-powers arguments raised in this Article could potentially provide fur-
ther normative support for the effort to resist the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
striking down campaign finance regulations.  The basic outline of such an approach 
should be evident from the preceding Parts.  In brief:  Political competition and the dif-
fusion of political power throughout the polity are independent constitutional values, 
worthy of protection.  Yet the dominance of wealth in politics, combined with rising 
wealth inequality, degrades political competition in government and concentrates power 
in too few hands.  Unregulated money and laws that burden voting rights of less affluent 
Americans thus stand in tension with the goals of separated powers.  Such an approach is, 
however, entirely unlikely to prevail in the current Court, and is of limited practical 
promise, as discussed below. 
356 Campaign finance, voting, and lobbying law have received and continue to receive exten-
sive scholarly attention.  On campaign finance, see, for example, LESSIG, supra note 6; 
POST, supra note 6.  On voting, see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats:  The Elusive Quest for Politi-
cal Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991) (using the Voting Rights Act to conceptualize the 
nature of minority voting exclusion); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is 
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996) (arguing for race conscious districting).  On lobby-
ing, see supra note 102. 
357 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (arguing that money finds new channels when existing routes 
are closed off); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 41 
(2012) (detailing recent Court decisions and describing a “reverse hydraulics” whereby 
the Court rolled back campaign finance law as it stood for decades and “political money 
has rushed back to newly deregulated channels like water finding its own level”).  In re-
cent years, election law scholars have increasingly turned their attention to lobbying law.  
E.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence:  The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 
ELECTION L. J. 160 (2014); Heather Gerken, Keynote Address:  Lobbying as the New Campaign 
Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying Rent Seeking, and the 
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forms, simply capping campaign contributions is unlikely to have 
much effect.  Meanwhile, disclosure and transparency regimes have 
been only minimally effective at identifying the most influential play-
ers in politics, while doing little to counter-balance wealth’s influ-
ence.358  And efforts to protect the right to vote at the individual level 
are unlikely, alone, to redress the significant imbalances in participa-
tion and power detailed in this Article:  Participation through voting 
is only one small way in which citizens participate in politics and gov-
ernance.359 
The separation-of-powers frame advanced in this Article helps il-
luminate a complementary path for reform, and one that has re-
ceived far less attention.  If the goal of the Madisonian system is for 
ambition to counter ambition, law reform should focus on facilitating 
the participation of countervailing organizations in government, as 
well as moderating the role of money in campaigns, increasing trans-
parency, and protecting individual voting rights.  Reforms aimed at 
involving groups of citizens in political decisionmaking would work to 
check and balance power so that one faction does not dominate.  
This basic approach has a long tradition and many variations.  While 
Madison envisioned the three branches of government countering 
one another’s ambition, other systems have allocated power across 
informal political substructures, like parties, unions, and social 
groups, in order to promote democratic decisionmaking.360 
From this perspective, some existing good-government reforms 
appear not only unsuccessful but also counter-productive.  Certain 
strategies, while unable in practice to reduce the flow of money,361 
have actually undermined organized, popularly rooted mobiliza-
 
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2011); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 
13 ELECTION L. J. 4 (2014). 
358 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443 (2014) (finding that compliance 
with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to 
identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system). 
359 See supra Part II (detailing mechanisms of participation by wealthy citizens and organiza-
tions). 
360 LIJPHART, supra note 75, at 9, 25 (contrasting separation-of-powers approaches to other 
constitutional power-sharing systems); see also AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: 
GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 181 (1999) (discussing 
corporatist systems in which interests groups are incorporated into the process of policy 
formation).  Cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 84–85 (1997) (discussing obstacles to and problems with use of corporatist 
structures in the United States). 
361 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 357; Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 118, 120, 125 (2010). 
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tion.362  Limits on coordination, for example, have reduced the ability 
of popular organizations to join together with political parties and 
candidates.  Other regulations have weakened political party efforts 
to mobilize new voters.363  As a group, these well-intentioned laws have 
made it harder to draw ordinary people into politics.364  Meanwhile, 
they have done little to counteract the influence wielded by business 
organizations in lobbying Congress, participating in the regulatory 
process, and exploiting the revolving door and other mechanisms of 
influence. 
Scholars in election law are increasingly moving away from insula-
tion—or efforts to “level down” campaign spending—and toward 
“leveling up” reforms aimed at bringing countervailing voices into 
public debates.  Bruce Cain has supported “the Madisonian principle 
of opposing faction with faction.”365  He writes that “another way to 
neutralize political advantage aside from capping and prohibiting is 
to support countervailing voices.”366  The mechanism he favors, along 
with other campaign finance scholars and good governance groups, 
is public financing.  Others extend this argument to the lobbying 
context, arguing that we should find ways to level up by publicly fi-
nancing lobbyists and making them available to congressional staff.367 
In the administrative law field, scholars make similar leveling-up 
arguments.  Wendy Wagner argues that institutional design reform 
should focus on making participation by a diverse range of partici-
pants easier, for example by lowering the cost of information and ac-
cess.368  She urges reforms that would make access and information 
 
362 SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 281. 
363 Robert F. Bauer, The Right to “Do Politics” and Not Just to Speak:  Thinking About the Constitu-
tional Protections for Political Action, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 67 (2013). 
364 SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 281. 
365 Bruce E. Cain, More or Less:  Searching for Regulatory Balance, in RACE, REFORM, AND 
REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS:  RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
263, 277 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al., eds., 2011).  For a discussion of this shift, see Sachs, 
supra note 26. 
366 Cain, supra note 365, at 277. 
367 E.g., Gerken, supra note 357, at 1165–67 (offering several ways for Congress to level up 
through increasing its own capacity). 
368 Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 671, 677, 692 (2013) (“In administrative law, agency bureaucrats and appointees are 
held accountable through a pluralistic system of oversight whereby the affected parties 
are invited to comment and then have an opportunity to seek judicial review of agency 
rules that stray outside the authorization of the statute or are arbitrary with respect to the 
agency’s underlying choices.  In order to make this administrative law work, however, the 
full range of affected groups must participate throughout the process without allowing 
one set of interests to dominate the process and capture the agency.”). 
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throughout the regulatory process less costly.369  Nina Mendelson has 
similarly focused on expanding public participation, urging agencies 
to take large volumes of comments more seriously.370 
Such proposals to increase participation through public financ-
ing, decreasing costs of access, and taking existing mass petitions 
more seriously are all promising from a separation-of-powers vantage 
point—they seek to enhance political contestation and provide miss-
ing checks on wealthy interests.371  Still, these proposals do little to re-
dress the underlying imbalance in organization—an imbalance fun-
damental to the problem identified in this Article. 
Legal interventions designed to facilitate organization are a neces-
sary complement.  Indeed, they may even have an important ad-
vantage over laws focusing only on individual access.372  Reforms 
aimed at increasing organizational capacity enable under-represented 
citizens to check and prod as do their wealthier counterparts—to ex-
ercise organized political power throughout the processes of politics 
and government.  Organizations permit individuals with low per capi-
ta resources to pool resources and speak with a stronger voice.373  As 
Benjamin Sachs writes, “a well-organized political group can mobilize 
voters and influence elections; it can lobby and influence legislation; 
it can buy media time and influence public opinion.”374  Well-
 
369 As Wagner notes, while the costs of commenting on a noticed rule is superficially low, 
there are multiple points of entry beyond notice and comment.  Id. at 686–87.  The peri-
od before Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the process of OIRA review, for example, 
are less transparent and more costly to access, providing significant opportunities for im-
balances in influence.  Id. at 688–89. 
370 Nina Mendelson, Foreword:  Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1343, 1380 (2011). 
371 Skeptics of Mendelson’s argument express concern that mass comments are group-
facilitated and that signatories might be signing because of group rhetoric.  Mendelson 
correctly retorts that excluding rulemaking comments because groups are involved or 
rhetoric is used would leave very few comments, but the problem is deeper than that:  
group participation should be encouraged and facilitated, not feared.  Id. at 1372–73. 
372 Benjamin Sachs has made this point in arguing for labor law reform.  Sachs, supra note 
26, at 171–75. 
373 See Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. 
& SOC’Y 393, 424 (1992); see also 1 JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ASSOCIATIONS AND 
DEMOCRACY:  THE REAL UTOPIAS PROJECT 126–27 (Erik Olin Wright, ed. 1985) (discussing 
how associative democracy based on non-governmental social groups could mitigate ine-
quality, assist underrepresented interest groups, and protect individual liberties); JOHN D. 
STEPHENS, THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM 49–50 (Michael Mann ed., 
1979) (discussing the importance of labor unions and other organizations in strengthen-
ing the welfare state and facilitating movement from capitalism to socialism); David Brad-
ley et al., Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies, 55 WORLD POL. 193, 
197 (2003) (“Organization in unions results in a shift of power in the market toward the 
union members.”). 
374 Sachs, supra note 26, at 167. 
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organized groups can also help shape regulatory agendas, comment 
on proposed rules, press for agency enforcement activity and so on.  
And to the extent such organizations are membership groups, rather 
than professionally managed “check-book” organizations, their partic-
ipation helps facilitate more representative and diffuse political in-
volvement.  Organizations funded by and directed by a range of 
Americans, representing their interests, can provide checks and 
prods now often missing. 
An organization-focused approach is supported by both historical 
and empirical evidence.  Historians have illuminated the instrumen-
tal role played by mass membership organizations in the passage of 
wage and hour laws, labor legislation, progressive taxes, and civil 
rights legislation, even in the face of staunch opposition from 
wealth.375  More recent empirical work also supports the conclusion 
that organization is essential to our basic system of fighting faction 
with faction.376  Martin Gilens, for example, finds an exception to the 
general rule that policy makers are far more responsive to the inter-
ests and preferences of the wealthy:  Where countervailing interest 
group power is exerted, government policy no longer simply tracks 
the preferences of the wealthy.377  Rather, on issues where organized 
groups advance the preferences of low- and middle-income Ameri-
cans, government outcomes more often correspond to the prefer-
ences of low- and middle-income Americans.378  Consistent with these 
findings, the state and local governments that have been most active 
in attempting to redress wealth inequality of late are those operating 
in regions with higher levels of organization among working peo-
ple.379  Recent experience regarding presidential executive orders, 
 
375 Lichtenstein, supra note 181, at 122–27. 
376 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 167–68. 
377 GILENS, supra note 191, at 121, 157–58. 
378 Id.  For example, Martin Gilens found that unions are among the most important forces 
moving policy in a direction desired by the less well off.  Id. at 158. 
379 In 2014, the Seattle City Council voted unanimously to raise the minimum hour wage to 
$15.  SEATTLE, WA., Code ch. 14.19 (2014).  In 2013, union members accounted for 
18.9% of wage and salary workers in Washington State, almost six percentage points 
above the national average of 11.3%.  Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union 
Membership in Washington—2013 (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/regions/west/news-
release/2014/pdf/unionmembership_washington_20140227.pdf.  In California, where 
the Los Angeles City Council is considering whether to raise the minimum wage to $15.25 
an hour by 2019, 16.4% of workers were union members in 2013.  Press Release,  Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Union Membership in California—2013 (Feb. 27, 2014),  
http://www.bls.gov/regions/west/news-release/2014/pdf/unionmembership_
california_20140226.pdf; Emily Alpert Reyes, Nine things to know about boosting the minimum 
wage in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-ln-minimum-wage-20150324-story.html. 
Dec. 2015] SEPARATIONS OF WEALTH 499 
 
such as the issuance of the labor executive orders following activity by 
worker groups, further supports the conclusion that countervailing 
organization can diffuse concentrated power.380 
2.  Building Countervailing Organization 
How then might legal and institutional reforms facilitate broader 
and more equitable participation in organized political life?  How 
might countervailing organizations be brought into governance?  A 
full exploration of that question obviously cannot be tackled in the 
remaining pages of this Article.  In separate work, I will examine the 
extent to which our civil society deficit is not simply a political prob-
lem, as is typically understood, but also a legal problem—a product of 
legal structures that discourage or inadequately facilitate organiza-
tion—with possible legal solutions.  Here, I identify several strategies, 
drawn from disparate fields in law and policy, worth further explora-
tion. 
First, administrative law and process could do more to provide a 
formal role in governance for public interest organizations, particu-
larly organizations that derive high proportions of funding from 
membership contributions (from natural persons) and have mem-
bers who enjoy rights to participate in associational decisionmaking.  
Rather than simply lowering the barrier to enter the political or gov-
erning process and hoping that lower-income individuals or under-
resourced organizations take advantage, membership organizations 
could be assigned more prominent roles of participation.  This could 
be done through any number of routes, such as soliciting their partic-
ipation in congressional hearings, Federal Advisory Committees, and 
in meetings with OIRA, the Domestic Policy Council, and other ad-
ministrative offices.  In addition to involving organizations in notice 
and comment, agencies could also establish mechanisms to solicit in-
put from membership associations regarding regulatory agendas and 
proposed rules.  Legislative offices could do the same.  Consumer 
empowerment programs advocated by such scholars as Ian Ayres and 
John Braithwaite, or new governance models, such as those advocated 
by Charles Sable and William Simon, offer a variation of this ap-
proach.381  These programs have been successful, although not uni-
 
380 See supra Part III.A. 
381 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:  TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATED DEBATE 15–16 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (proposing regulatory 
regimes more responsive to industry and consumer associations); Charles F. Sabel & Wil-
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formly so, at creating countervailing checks in the regulatory pro-
cess.382  They could potentially be more so if targeted at organizations 
with a membership, rather than a management, character,383 and if 
uncoupled from a strongly market-oriented approach to regulation. 
Public interest organizations could also be involved in helping 
agencies achieve compliance with the law.  For example, Janice Fine 
and Jennifer Gordon demonstrate how labor inspectorates that have 
given organizations like unions and worker centers a formal, ongoing 
role in enforcement in low-wage sectors have had greater success.384  
While Fine and Gordon’s aim is to achieve greater legal compliance, 
involving civil society in enforcement efforts could also serve to 
strengthen political competition and to diffuse power:  It provides 
agency officials the perspectives of a different segment of the popula-
tion and counteracts capture by well-funded industry groups.  Fur-
thermore, involving membership associations more directly in setting 
policy agendas, developing policy ideas, and achieving compliance 
makes it more worthwhile for ordinary Americans to join the discus-
sion.385 
Second, to make such governance reforms work, organizations 
representing low- and middle-income Americans must be much more 
prevalent.  To that end, the revitalization of worker organizations is 
essential.  As previously discussed, among the interest groups operat-
ing in the United States today, labor unions’ policy positions are most 
closely associated with the preferences of the less well-off.386  In the 
United States, unions have successfully organized lower- and middle-
income Americans for political action to greater extent than any oth-
er non-party actor.  Though their track record has been checkered, 
they constitute some of the few mass-membership organizations re-
maining.  Meanwhile, there are indications that recent efforts by the 
labor movement are more focused on political action and class-based 
 
liam H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 
56 (2011) (analyzing minimalist and experimentalist models of public intervention). 
382 For an analysis of potential problems with empowerment of stakeholders as a means of 
creating collaborative government and a discussion of the contexts in which collaborative 
governance has been most successful, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders:  Limits 
on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 413 (2000). 
383 See id. at 500 (emphasizing need for interest group internal democracy). 
384 Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partner-
ship with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 559 (2010). 
385 SKOCPOL, supra note 5, at 290. 
386 Sachs, supra note 26, at 168–69 (quoting GILENS, supra note 191).  For further discussion, 
see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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legislation, and less focused on site-by-site organizing and bargain-
ing.387 
Building on those efforts, labor law should be reformed to en-
courage worker organizations and to facilitate their active participa-
tion in politics and governance.  While scholars have offered a host of 
labor law reform proposals, few have focused their attention specifi-
cally on the political capacity of worker organizations.388  More 
thought is needed on that subject, as well on how law can facilitate 
organization among low- and middle-income Americans in contexts 
other than the workplace, including in schools, public benefit offices, 
churches and other religious institutions, and community based or-
ganizations.389 
Third, political parties could be redesigned to strengthen the role 
of rank-and-file members and to shift the balance away from elites.  
To that end, some scholars have suggested that we reform campaign 
finance law to channel contributions back to the formal political par-
ties and away from large-donor governed “shadow parties” like Super 
PACs.390  Others advocate amending political law to ease restrictions 
on grassroots organizing and coordination.391  Reinvigorated political 
parties might not lead to less partisanship, but they could enhance 
government accountability.  Indeed, as Walter Dean Burham has ar-
gued, strong, participatory parties with coherent ideologies help gov-
ernment minimize the influence of powerful, rent-seeking economic 
interests.392 
 
387 Kate Andrias, Law and the Labor Question in the Post New Deal Order:  Reasoning from the Fight 
for $15 (Univ. of Cal. Santa Barbara, Beyond the New Deal Order Conference, Sept. 24-
26, 2015) (on file with author). 
388 Benjamin Sachs’ “unbundled union” proposal is a notable exception.  Sachs, supra note 
26, at 153, 155 (arguing that opposition to collective bargaining impedes unions’ ability 
to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lower- and middle-income groups and advo-
cating an “unbundled labor law” that would allow workers to form a “political union,” 
which would be barred by statute from engaging in collective bargaining, but would be 
able to serve as a vehicle for collective political voice for workers who decided to join). 
389 For some tentative ideas on how law might facilitate organization among low-income 
Americans, see Sachs, supra note 26. 
390 See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 175 at 179, 211–12 (analyzing McCutcheon’s impact on 
campaign-finance, namely the facilitation of shadow parties and their resulting implica-
tions for party politics); Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 185, at 32–33 (describing the rise of 
shadow parties and decline of the formal political parties). 
391 See Bauer, supra note 363, at 81–82 (arguing for greater consideration of “doing politics” 
instead of merely focusing on speech in the context of campign-finance jurisprudence). 
392 WALTER DEAN BURHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 130–33 (1970) (arguing that strong parties with coherent ideologies are an im-
portant mechanism by which the government can minimize the influence of powerful, 
rent-seeking economic interests). 
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Fourth, we could unfetter the political activity of existing mem-
bership associations by reforming tax law.  Under the current regime, 
non-profit organizations are penalized for engaging in political activi-
ty and they receive little benefit from being representative in struc-
ture.  Law reforms could alter existing incentives.  For example, rules 
designed to create firewalls in non-profits between partisan and non-
partisan activities could be repealed.  Tax law could provide incen-
tives for associations that derive high proportions of funding from 
natural-person membership contributions and have members who 
enjoy rights to participate in associational decision-making.393 
An obvious objection to these proposals is that if wealth is so pow-
erful, no such changes could ever be enacted.  The critique is true to 
a point.  Significant reform is unlikely in the current political envi-
ronment.  But as this Article has acknowledged, the power of wealth 
ebbs depending on circumstance and alignments:  When issues be-
come particularly salient, the power of wealthy individuals and their 
organizations can be overcome and their views can shift.394  And, in-
deed, in recent months it appears that public concern about econom-
ic inequality is mounting, creating pressure on elected officials, 
Democrat and Republican, to respond.395  The goal is to suggest that 
if and when significant political and governance reform becomes pos-
sible, it should focus beyond efforts at insulation from, and modera-
tion of, partisanship, and even beyond efforts to control campaign 
money, to reforms that would shift long-term distribution of political 
and economic power. 
 
393 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society:  The Social Cost of Internally Un-
democratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 831–32, 892–93 (2003) (discussing the significant 
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costs). 
394 For example, in November 2010, the House voted to ban the special-purpose spending 
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House Republicans Back No-Earmarks Rule, N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS (Nov. 18, 2010, 1:13 
PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/house-republicans-back-no-
earmarks-rule/. 
395 See Amy Chozick, Economic Plan Is a Quandary for Clinton ‘16, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at 
A1; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Talk of Wealth Gap Prods the G.O.P. to Refocus, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, at A1 (detailing the shift in the traditional Republican narrative 
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O’Connor, 2016 Populism on Left or Right Worries Chamber of Commerce, WALL ST. J. 
WASHINGTON WIRE (Dec. 31, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/
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ber of Commerce’s concerns about the 2016 presidential campaign’s emphasis on eco-
nomic disparities). 
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Whether any of the particular strategies identified above is worth 
pursuing depends on their attendant costs to other democratic values 
and on the relative merits of institutional and doctrinal alternatives.  
Greater participation, for example, does not always lead to greater 
organization.  For present purposes, however, the goal is to highlight 
the intimate relationship between constitutional structure and the 
role of organization in American civic and political life.  The rules 
that structure American organizations should be seen as an essential 
complement to the Article I and Article II provisions creating the 
competing interests of the political branches—and they should be 
seen as no less foundational to constitutional governance than the 
political parties and the internal bureaucracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Leading constitutional law theorists and many public commenta-
tors worry intensely about the nefarious impact partisanship has had 
on our system of constitutional governance, and particularly on the 
expansion of the executive and the impotence of Congress.  Ameri-
cans, they argue, must, if nothing else, overcome political polariza-
tion.  Those who study the internal workings of the executive branch 
agree, though they are more optimistic; they promise that bureaucra-
cy and internal checks offer a shield against partisanship, gridlock, 
and the unbound executive.  While both of these accounts have con-
siderable purchase, their failure to consider how wealth systematically 
shapes the branches, the parties, and the executive’s internal mecha-
nisms leads to descriptive oversights.  Whatever one’s normative take, 
executive power, legislative gridlock, and internal executive branch 
checks cannot be understood absent a political economy analysis. 
But while the primary goal of this Article has been critical and de-
scriptive, the claim is also normative:  Even when partisan and inter-
nal executive branch checks are in place, power is concentrated in 
too few hands—in ways detrimental to liberty, governmental efficacy, 
and, particularly, democratic accountability.  Ultimately, if such goals 
remain aspirations of American government, reforms encouraging 
the participation of not only individuals but also countervailing or-
ganizations are paramount.  This Article has only suggested some po-
tential reforms to that end.  The project of thinking them through is 
all the more urgent as inequality soars, membership in labor organi-
zations declines, and the voices of middle- and lower-income Ameri-
cans become fainter throughout the political and governing process. 
 
